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This thesis addresses the complex process of transferring cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) to Rwanda.  After a decade of prosecuting the leaders and organisers of the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide that killed an estimated 500,000 to 1 million ethnic Tutsis, the Security Council of the United Nations 
called for the closure of the Tribunal.   In an effort to complete all trial activities, the Completion Strategy has 
involved transferring the indictments of low to mid-level accused to national jurisdictions for trial.   
 
With donor fatigue, frustration with the efficiency of the Ad-Hoc tribunals and the desire for states to manage their 
own issues, there is a shift in enforcement of international criminal law away from international tribunals.  The 
outcome is that national courts will be increasingly responsible for the accountability of international crimes and 
the application of fair trial rights.   As a result, the importance of cases being prosecuted domestically with the 
appropriate level of fair trial standards and the capacity of national systems will be increasingly important. 
 
To transfer a case to a national court, the ICTR has to be satisfied that the court by which the case is referred to has 
the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.  Moreover, it has to confirm that the standards of trial in respect to fairness 
are satisfactory.  Once the case has been transferred, the ICTR can appoint a monitor to observe the proceedings in 
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Genocide Ideology law.  However, this thesis has shown the most challenging part of capacity building by a 
foreign body is the sensitive and cautious way these issues need to be approached.   
 
This thesis concludes that, from the creation of new witness protection programs, video link technology, building 
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these possible inequalities, the correct decision to transfer the cases to Rwanda is a step forward towards ending 
impunity.  It means that Rwanda is willing and able to prosecute their crimes.  Following the ICTR’s approach 
towards strengthening fair trial and penalty standards in Rwanda will be a valuable lesson for the future of 
International Criminal Law, particularly in light of increased domestic prosecutions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The year of 2014 has marked the 20th anniversary since the Rwandan Genocide.  
Following the assassination of the Rwandan President Habyarimana on the 6 April 
1994, an estimated 500,000 to 1 million ethnic Tutsis were killed over a three-month 
period.1  Although the Security Council of the United Nations (hereinafter UNSC) 
withdrew most of the peacekeepers during this time,2 on 1 July 1994, it voted to 
establish an Independent Commission of Experts, which made a formal 
recommendation to “enhance the fair and consistent interpretation, application and 
adjudication of international law on individual responsibility for serious human rights 
violations.”  Therefore for the most efficient allocation of resources, the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter the 
ICTY) should be expanded to permit cases concerning the situation in Rwanda to be 
brought under it.”3 On the 8 November 1994, Security Council Resolution 955 was 
adopted establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter 
ICTR).4 Similar to the ICTY, in consideration of the on-going conflicts, lack of 
judicial capacity and professionalism,5 the UNSC granted the ICTR concurrent 
jurisdiction with national courts to prosecute persons for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.  However, it also emphasised that the ICTR shall have 
the primacy over the national courts of all states.  Therefore, at any stage of the trial 
procedure, the ICTR may formally request national courts to defer its competence. 6   
 
In 2003, a decade later, the UNSC called on the ICTY and ICTR (hereinafter the Ad-
Hoc tribunals) to take every possible measure to complete all trial activities at 
instance by the end of 2008, and to finish all work by 2010.7  The Ad-Hoc tribunals                                                         
1 William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (1st edn, CUP 2006) 25. 
2 ibid. 
3 UNSC, ‘Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance 
with Security Council Resolution 935 (4 October 1994)’, UN Doc S/1994/1125 para 149. 
4 UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955. 
5Roberto Bellelli,‘The Establishment of the System of International Criminal Justice’ in Roberto 
Bellelli (ed) International Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2010) 12. 
6 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994, entered into force 20 June 1995) UN Doc S/RES/955 (n 4); 
Bartham Brown, ‘Primacy or Complementarily: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (1998) 23 YJIL 383 395.  
7 UNSC Res 1503 (28 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1503 (UNSC Res 1503) para 7; UNSC Res 1534 
(26 March 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1534 para 3 (UNSC Res 1534). 
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would be required to provide a report every six months to the UNSC detailing the 
progress made towards the implementation the completion of the work of the 
tribunals, which was called the Completion Strategy.8  As a main part of completing 
the mandates of the Ad-Hoc tribunals, cases that have had their indictment confirmed 
are to be transferred to national criminal jurisdictions.9  This thesis concerns Rule 11 
bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,10 which governs the referral procedure of 
the cases which are transferred back to the Republic of Rwanda (hereinafter Rwanda) 
for adjudication.  Therefore, these cases will be referred to throughout this thesis as 
the transfer cases.   
 
The complex nature of the implementation of Rule 11 bis occurred to me when I was 
working as a legal intern at the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTR in Arusha, at the 
end of 2012.  During my internship I had the privilege of watching the judgment of 
the case Gatete v The Prosecutor11 being handed down by the Appeals Chamber.  The 
Chamber affirmed Jean-Batiste Gatete’s conviction for genocide and extermination as 
a crime against humanity, as well as entered a conviction for conspiracy to commit 
genocide for his role in the killing of thousands of Tutsis during the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide. However, his sentence was reduced from life imprisonment to a penalty of 
40 years because he had spent over seven years in pre-trial detention awaiting trial. 
This time was deemed by the Chamber to violate his right to be trialled without undue 
delay.12  Curiously, one of the reasons the Trial Chamber had given for this delay was 
that the case had been selected for referral pursuant to Rule 11 bis.13  This case was 
the first encounter I had with the complexity of a referral for transfer. Over the next 
four months, I conducted legal research for the Office of the Prosecutor. However at 
the back of my mind, I remained perplexed as to the reasons why the implementation 
of a procedural rule could be a cause for a case to be delayed for over seven years.14 
 
                                                        
8 UNSC Res 1503 (n 7) para 6; UNSC Res 1534 (n 7) para 6. 
9 Jan Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (1st edn, 
OUP 2008) 68. 
10 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (adopted 8 
November 1994, entered into force 20 June 1995) UN Doc ITR/3/Rev 1 (ICTR RPE). 
11 (Appeals Judgment) ICTR-00-61-A (9 October 2012). 
12 ibid para 45. 
13 ibid. 
14 The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the International Tribunal or the United Nations in general. 
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Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, for a successful transfer, a Trial Chamber has to be satisfied 
that the court by which the case is referred to has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
case.15  Moreover, the Trial Chamber also has to confirm that the penalty as well as 
the fair trial standards to be applied if the domestic courts conduct the trial is 
satisfactory.16  Once a case has been transferred, the Trial Chamber can order 
observers to monitor the proceedings in the State concerned.17  As attempted referrals 
to Rwanda have easily met the jurisdictional requirements of the territory the crime 
was committed, considerations of fair trial guarantees and the applicable penalty have 
been questioned and thus will be focused on in this thesis.   Throughout the history of 
the transfer case decisions, the defence counsel for the accused persons (hereinafter 
the Defence) have raised a number of fair trial issues that might arise if the case is 
transferred to Rwanda.  These issues include independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary, the presumption of innocence of the accused, the right to an effective 
defence, double jeopardy and witness availability and protection.  Moreover, the 
Defence has also been concerned by the applicable penalty the accused could face if 
convicted.  In particular, of concern is for the conditions of detention and whether the 
accused would face the death penalty or imprisonment in isolation.   
 
Although academically the ICTR’s Completion Strategy had been discussed widely,18 
there has not been much written on the recent jurisprudence of the transfer cases19                                                         
15 If an indictment has been confirmed, “the President may designate a Trial Chamber which shall 
determine whether a case should be referred to the authorities of a State: (i) in whose territory the crime 
was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) having jurisdiction and being willing 
and adequately prepared to accept such a case, to the appropriate court for trial within that state.” RPE 
(n 10) Rule 11 bis, para a. 
16 According to the RPE, “In determining whether to refer the case the Chamber shall satisfy itself that 
the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty will 
not be imposed or carried out.” RPE (n 10) Rule 11 bis, para c. 
17 ibid, para d (i). 
18 See for example, Cecile Aptel, ‘Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: 
Completion Strategy and Residual issues’ (2008) 14 NEJICL 169; Daryl Mundis, ‘Completing the 
mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?’ 
(2004) 28 FILJ 591; Eric Møse, ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’ (2005) 3 JICJ 920; Eric Møse, ‘The 
ICTR’s Completion Strategy – Challenges and Possible Solutions’ (2008) 6 JICJ 667; Larry Johnson, 
‘Closing an International Criminal Tribunal while maintaining International Human Rights Standards 
and Excluding Impunity’, (2005) 99 AJIL 158; Lara Bingham,‘Strategy or Process? Closing the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2005) 24 BJIL 701. 
19 The most recent academic discussion I am aware of is the book Lindemann Lena, Referral of cases 
from international to national criminal jurisdictions: transferring cases from the ICTY and ICTR to 
national jurisdictions (1st ed, Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2013) which does not discuss the transfer of 
Uwinkindi or the aftermath.  I have not encountered articles, which discuss the reports of the monitor.  
For example see, Alex Obote-Odora, ‘Transfer of cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda on Domestic Jurisdictions’ (2012) 5 AJLS 147; Amelia Canter, ‘For these reasons, the 
Chamber: Denies the Prosecutor’s request for referral: The False hope of Rule 11 bis’ (2008) 32 FILJ 
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particularly after the decision of case Uwinkindi, which allowed for the first transfer 
of a case to Rwanda.20  Perhaps the winding down of the ICTR and ICTY, has been a 
reason for disinterest.  However, according to Donlon, the dire state of funding for 
war crimes tribunals and the frustration with efficiency of the tribunals has resulted in 
the lack of budgetary support for the Ad-Hoc tribunals.  For that reason, there is a 
shift in the enforcement of international criminal law away from the Ad-Hoc 
international tribunals to hybrid and national courts.  He argues that the outcome of 
this paradigm shift is the progressive development of national laws to ensure 
accountability for international crimes and guarantee the application of international 
human rights norms during trials.21  Rikhof agrees, adding that a large number of 
domestic players have entered the international justice arena.22  This has included 
prosecutions based on territorial jurisdiction by the country where the crimes 
occurred, active nationality jurisdiction where perpetrators were nationals of the 
prosecuting country or based on universal jurisdiction.23  Moreover, since the 
International Criminal Court is intended to be complementary to the domestic courts, 
the court can only gain jurisdiction when the domestic legal system is unwilling or 
genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution for an accused 
individual.24  It has been argued that the idea of complementarily, will likely push 
states to retain control over prosecuting its own nationals.25  According to Charney, 
“As a rule, states wish to manage issues themselves and voluntarily refer matters to 
international tribunals only when no other choice presents itself or when it enables the 
resolution of international disputes arising from domestic difficulties of limited                                                                                                                                                               
1614; Jennifer Morris, ‘The Trouble with Transfers: An Analysis of the Referral of Uwinkindi to the 
Republic of Rwanda’ (2012) 90 WULR 505; Jens Diekmann, ‘UN Ad Hoc Tribunals Under Pressure-
Completion Strategy and Referral Practice of the ICTY and ICTR from the Perspective of the Defence’ 
(2008) 8 ICLR 87; Ruth Frölich, ‘Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda’, (2008), 47 ILM 740. 
20 Prosecutor v Jean Uwinkindi (Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda) ICTR-2001-75-R11bis (28 June 2011); Jean Uwinkindi v The Prosecutor (Decision on 
Uwinkindi's Appeal against the Referral of his case to Rwanda and Related Motions) ICTR-01-75-
AR11bis, (16 December 2011). 
21 Fidelma Dolon, ‘Completion or Creation: Is the closure of international courts promoting the creation 
of domestic courts to enforce international law?’ (2008) <www.isrcl.org:Papers:2008:Dolan> accessed 
5 March 2014 3.  
22 Joseph Rikhof, ‘Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions on 
International Impunity’ (2009) 20 CLF 1.36. 
23 ibid 3. 
24 Mark Ellis, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Application for Domestic Law and National 
Capacity Building’ (2002-2003) 15 FJIL 215 221; Rome Statute (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into 
force 1 July 2002) A/CONF.183/9 art 17.       
25 ibid 223. 
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national concern.”26  He believes that “states will feel impelled to try persons accused 
of such crimes as to pursue those cases in a bona fide way.”27 As a result, this author 
argues that the importance of cases being prosecuted domestically with the 
appropriate level of fair trial standards and the capacity of national systems will 
become increasingly important.  If fair trial standards have not been adequately 
assessed in the transfer cases, the international community will be approving of 
domestic trials without the guarantee of the application of international fair trial 
norms.  Further, the lessons of capacity building and establishing fair trial standards 
from the transfer cases can be applied to the increasing prosecution of international 
crimes domestically. 
 
Consequently, this thesis strives to not only explore the challenges of the transfer 
cases, but also look forward, past the legacy of the Ad-Hoc tribunals and determine 
the effect on the future of prosecuting international crimes.  Therefore, I will analyse 
the decisions of the ICTR, which have adjudicated the requests for the referral of 
cases.  In particular, I will focus on the reasons why these referrals were initially 
denied and how the ICTR found these challenges were addressed to allow for the 
successful transfer decision starting from the case of Uwinkindi.28  Given the number 
of concerns discussed and the limits of this thesis, I will not be addressing all areas 
discussed by the ICTR, which could prevent transfer.  I will instead concentrate on 
the reasons for which the ICTR chose not to transfer the case of Munyakazi,29 the first 
application by the Prosecutor for referral to Rwanda.  Specifically, these concerns are 
the independence of the judiciary,30 witness availability and protection,31 and the 
applicable penalty.32  Moreover, I will also discuss the reasons why the Appeals 
Chamber decided to confirm the transfer of Uwinkindi to Rwanda, as well as the 
changes between these two decisions.  
                                                         
26 Jonathan Charney ‘Editorial Comments: International Criminal and the Role of Domestic Courts’ 
(2001) 95 AJIL 120 122. 
27 ibid 123. 
28 Prosecutor v Jean Uwinkindi, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda (n 20). 
29 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi (Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda) ICTR-97-36-R11bis (28 May 2008). 
30 ibid para 48. 
31 ibid para 66. 
32 ibid para 33. 
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Since the appeals decision of Uwinkindi has confirmed the referral of the case to 
Rwanda, the Office of the Prosecutor has appointed a monitor to observe proceedings, 
which has been reporting to the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals.33  
On the 3rd of May 2013, the Appeals Chamber upheld the referral of the case of 
Munyagishari34 to Rwanda for trial where the Prosecutor also appointed a monitor to 
observe the proceedings.35 In the Reports of the Monitor, the monitor has reported 
concerns that have arisen after the cases have been transferred and other observations 
from the trial. These concerns have included issues with translation of court 
proceedings and documents, appointment of defence counsel of the accused’s choice, 
prison facilities, funding for the defence and witness protection.  For that reason in the 
thesis I will also discuss the lack of legal aid funding for the indignant accused 
pointed out by the monitor.  This concern was made apparent after the cases of 
Uwinkindi and Munyagishari were transferred.  Throughout the decisions of the 
ICTR, this issue was not considered a problem, and could cast doubt on whether the 
ICTR made a correct decision to transfer cases to Rwanda. 
 
This thesis will begin by introducing the transfer cases, in particular their background 
and procedural history.  Specifically, Chapter 2 will outline the idea behind referring 
cases from the ICTR back to Rwanda, as a part of the conclusion of the mandate of 
the tribunal and more generally, the overall aims of the ICTR.  The aim of this chapter 
is for the reader to have an awareness of the objectives of the transfer cases and 
therefore come to an understanding of the reasons why certain issues have held back 
the transfer of cases to Rwanda.  Initially, in the cases before the decision in the case 
of Uwinkindi,36 the ICTR decided not to transfer the cases based on fair trial and 
penalty reasons.  Therefore, Chapter 3, 4 and 5 will analyse the turning points in the 
case of Uwinindi,37 which initially have hindered transfer.  Through an examination 
of the decisions of the ICTR, I will firstly discuss the two issues of fair trial and then                                                         
33 UNSC,‘First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ (1 
August 2013) S/2013/464 para 51. 
34 Bernard Munyagashiri, ‘Request for deferral of transfer of B. Munyagishari due to serious violation 
of fundamental rights’ (MICT-12-20, 19 August 2013) 
<http://unmict.org/files/cases/munyagishari/other/130830.pdf> accessed 13 March 2014. 
35 UNSC,‘First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ (n 33) 
para 53. 
36 Prosecutor v Uwinkindi, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (n 
20). 
37 ibid. 
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the applicable penalty for the accused.  In Chapter 3, I will turn to concerns the ICTR 
has had for the independence and the impartiality of the Rwandan judiciary to 
adjudicate the transfer cases.  This will be followed by a discussion of the 
apprehension for the Accused’s fair trial right to obtain the attendance of, and to 
examine, defence witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses called by the 
prosecution in Chapter 4.  In Chapter 5, I will discuss concerns that the accused will 
not receive a fair penalty in line with international standards and could face life 
imprisonment in isolation.  In Chapter 6, I will address main concern of the aftermath 
of the transfer cases, that is, the adequate legal aid funding for the transferred accused.  
Lastly, in Chapter 7, I will conclude this thesis expressing whether I believe the ICTR 
has adequately determined these challenges have been resolved and how these issues 
may appear in the future of the prosecution of international crimes. 
 
 
 
  8 
 
2.  The transfer cases from the ICTR to Rwanda  
2.1 The Completion Strategy of the ICTR 
From the underpinnings of the tribunal, it is possible to determine the reasons why 
Rwanda was not considered an appropriate seat for the ICTR. The United Nations 
Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) established the ICTR by a resolution adopted on 
8 November 199438 to prosecute perpetrators responsible for genocide and other 
violations of international humanitarian law, committed in Rwanda and the territory 
of neighbouring states.39 From the outset, on the basis of criteria set out in this 
resolution,40 the Secretary-General concluded that Rwanda as the location for the 
tribunal “would not be feasible or appropriate.”41 The Secretary-General reasoned that 
although “the international character of the Rwanda Tribunal is a guarantee of the just 
and fair conduct of legal process,”42 for complete impartiality and objectivity in the 
prosecution of persons responsible for crimes committed by both sides to the conflict, 
the trial proceedings had to be held in a neutral territory.  The Secretary-General 
especially noted that in Rwanda, there were serious security risks in bringing into the 
country, leaders of the previous regime alleged to have committed acts of genocide to 
stand trial before the Tribunal.43  Instead, Arusha the diplomatic city of Tanzania, was 
considered to have better “administrative efficiency and economy”44 and the premise 
for the court was already available. 45  
 
Although the government of Rwanda initially requested an international tribunal to 
aid in the prosecution of the 1994 Genocide,46 Rwanda decided to vote against the 
                                                        
38 UNSC Res 955 (n 4) 
39 ibid para 1. 
40 According to paragraph 6, “the seat of the International Tribunal shall be determined by the Council 
having regard to considerations of justice and fairness as well as administrative efficiency including 
access to witnesses, and economy…” ibid; UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of UNSC Resolution 955 (1994)’ (13 February 1995) General S1995/134 para 41. 
41 UNSC Res 955 (n 4) para 45. 
42 ibid para 42. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid para 43. 
45 ibid. 
46 UNSC ‘Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the permanent representative of Rwanda to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (29 September 1994) General S/1994/1115. 
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resolution establishing the tribunal for a number of reasons.47 Specifically, Rwanda 
felt that the time period for which the ICTR could prosecute within was too short.48 
The government was also discontent with a number of other issues, in particular, 
sharing the Appeals Chamber and the Prosecutor with the ICTY, the lack of crimes 
being prioritised in the draft statute establishing the tribunal, proposals for candidates 
for judges from countries believed to have actively participated in the civil war in 
Rwanda, that detainees would be imprisoned outside Rwanda, and that the seat would 
not being held within Rwanda.  Also, Rwanda advocated for capital punishment as 
provided for in the Rwandese penal code, a penalty that would not be used by the 
ICTR.49  It was contended that since the ICTR would be mainly prosecuting suspects 
who were the main organisers and planners of the genocide, namely “the big fish”, 
these transferred accused would escape capital punishment.  In contrast, those who 
carried out the genocide, in other words “the small fish,” would be tried in Rwandan 
courts and face capital punishment. Overall, this situation was argued to be non-
conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.50  Despite this negative vote within 
the UNSC, Rwanda declared its willingness to cooperate with the tribunal and 
generally continued to do so.51 It is important to highlight the reasons by which 
Rwanda did not support the initial establishment of the ICTR, as they would later 
pose challenges for the transfer cases.   
 
Throughout the operation of the tribunal, relations with the government of Rwanda 
were described as “often stormy.”52 For example, when the Appeals Chamber granted 
the motion of a key defendant and permanently stayed all proceedings in the case, the 
government of Rwanda became “enraged at the resulting impunity.”  As a result, 
Rwanda threatened to bar ICTR officials from entering its territory.53   The Appeals 
Chamber reversed the decision knowing that this move would affect the ICTR’s 
ability to operate.54  Also, for a short time in 2002, the Rwandan Government did not                                                         
47 UNSC ‘3453rd meeting’ (8 November 1994) S/PV 3453 1 (3453rd meeting) as cited by Daphna 
Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘Symposium towards an International Criminal Court: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1996) 7 EJIL 501, 504. 
48 ibid 514-515. 
49 3453rd meeting (n 47) 14-15.  
50 ibid 16.  
51 Shraga and Zacklin (n 47) 505. 
52 William Schabas referring to the Bizimungu case in Schabas (n 1) 31. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
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facilitate the travel document applications for witnesses made by the Tribunal.  Two 
Rwandan associations of victims had announced they would discontinue their 
cooperation with the tribunal, complaining that witnesses were not being sufficiently 
protected and that suspects of genocide were being employed as defence 
investigators.  The Rwandan authorities maintained that they could not compel the 
associations to cooperate with the ICTR. As a result, the UNSC issued a statement 
reminding the government of Rwanda of the mandatory obligation of all states to 
cooperate fully with the ICTR.55  The previous willingness for the Rwandan 
government to interfere in work of the ICTR raises concerns as to whether an 
independent judgment can be made by the Rwandan judiciary for the cases 
transferred.  Particularly, the question arises as to whether the government would also 
interfere in the decision of the local Rwandan courts, which would adjudicate the 
transfer cases. 
 
The transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwanda was largely influenced by the strategy 
of the ICTY.  On the 12th of May 2000, a report by President Jorda to the Security 
Council initiated a discussion concerning transfer cases from the Ad-Hoc tribunals.  
This report proposed that the ICTY should consider holding trials in the Balkans.56  
The report suggested that the tribunal would concentrate on a restricted number of 
high-ranking leaders alike the Nuremburg model and would retain competence on 
appeal.57  The report also recommended measures to increase trial capacity including 
appointing ad-litem judges,58 delegating some of the pre-trial judge powers to take 
judicial administrative decisions to senior legal officers of the Trial Chamber59 and 
enlarging the Appeals Chamber.60  In response, the Security Council adopted a 
resolution, which established a pool of ad-litem judges and enlarged the membership 
                                                        
55 UNSC ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’ (18 December 2002) General 
S/PRST/2002/39 paras 3-5; Erik Møse, ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’ (2005) 3 JICJ 920 939. 
56 UNSC ‘Identical letters dated 7 September 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council’ UN Doc A/55/382-
S/2000/863, Annex 1 as cited by Fidelma Donlon, ‘The Judicial Role in the Definition and 
Implementation of the Completion Strategies of the International Criminal Tribunals’ in Shane Darcy 
and Joseph Powderly (eds) Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (1st edn, OUP, 
2010) 357. 
57 ibid para 56. 
58 ibid para 106-117. 
59 ibid para 97-99. 
60 ibid para 140. 
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of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.61  Further, the Security Council decided that 
two additional judges would be elected to the ICTR.62   
 
Adding to the discussion of transferring cases from the Ad-Hoc tribunals, the 
President, Prosecutor and the Registrar produced a report in June 2002 on the 
prospects for referring certain cases to national courts.  They had created a working 
group whose mission was to examine the problems, which might arise through the 
implementation of the process of referring certain cases.63  Despite the increase in the 
size of the tribunal and the appointment of ad-litem Judges,64 the report argued that 
the ICTY could not try all the accused persons on its own.65  The report therefore 
recommended that low-ranking subordinates be indicted and tried by the national 
courts and national courts may try “intermediary-level accused” provided that the 
courts fully conform to internationally recognised standards and due process.66  The 
President of the Security Council endorsed the Completion Strategy.67   
 
Subsequently, the Security Council in Resolution 150368 reiterated the ICTY 
Completion Strategy for “completing investigations by the end of 2008” and “all of its 
work in 2010 by concentrating on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders 
suspected of being responsible for crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction and 
transferring cases involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility to 
competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate.”69  In Security Council Resolutions 
1503 and 1534, the ICTR was urged by the UNSC to formalise a detailed strategy, 
modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy, where the most-senior leaders would be 
prosecuted by international jurisdiction and cases involving intermediate or low-
ranked accused would be transferred to competent national jurisdictions as 
appropriate, including Rwanda, “to achieve its objectives of completion by the end of 
                                                        
61 UNSC Res 1329 (5 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1329 para 1. 
62 ibid para 2. 
63 UNSC ‘Letter dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General addresses to the President of the 
Security Council’ (17 June 2002) General UN Doc S/2002/678 para 6. 
64 ibid para 10, 19. 
65 ibid paras 10-30. 
66 ibid para 32. 
67 UNSC ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’, (23 July 2002) General UN Doc 
S/PRST/2002. 
68 UNSC Res 1503 (n 7). 
69 ibid, preamble. 
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2008.”70 Subsequently, in 2002, Rule 11 bis in the ICTR Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence was amended to broaden the rule so that the accused could be transferred to 
a jurisdiction other than the state in which the accused was arrested.71  This went 
further than the ICTY Rule 11 bis, which at the time only allowed the case to be 
transferred to the arresting state.72   
 
Notably, Resolution 1503 also called upon the international community to “assist 
national jurisdictions, as part of the Completion Strategy, in improving their capacity 
to prosecute cases transferred from the ICTY and ICTR and encouraged the ICTY and 
ICTR Presidents, Prosecutors and Registrars to develop and improve their outreach 
[programs].”73  The General Assembly reiterated the importance of carrying out an 
effective outreach programme within the overall mandate of the ICTR and its 
Completion Strategy, requesting the Tribunal to increase its capacity and out-reach 
activities.74  According to the Secretary General “strengthening the judicial and 
prosecuting capacity of the affected countries is a key element of the Tribunals’ 
mandates and will be an important legacy.  Effective capacity-building may assist in 
the Tribunal’s efforts to refer further cases to national jurisdictions and to support 
national prosecuting authorities.”75   
 
However, it has been argued that due to the adoption of these two Security Council 
Resolutions, the Ad-Hoc tribunals have been put under an enormous time and 
political pressure to comply with the deadlines scheduled by the Completion 
Strategy.76  Further, the budgetary concerns of the ICTR may be an influencing factor                                                         
70 UNSC Res 1503 (n 7) preamble; UNSC Res 1534 (n 7) paras 4-5. 
71 ICTR,  ‘ICTR 12th Plenary Session 5-6 June 2002 Amendments adopted at the Plenary Session of the 
Judges ‘ (ICTR, 5-6 Junes 2002) 
<http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Evidance/English/amend12.pdf> accessed 20 October 
2013. 
72 UNSC ‘Twenty-sixth Session 11 & 12 July 2002’ (11-12 July 2002) UN Doc IT/32/Rev. 24. 
73 UNSC Res 1503 (n 7). 
74 UNGA ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2005’ (15 February 2006) 
UN Doc A/RES/60/241, paras 9-10; UNGA ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 
December 2010’  (2 March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/252, para 11 as cited by Adama Dieng 
‘Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy’ (2010) 9 NWUJIHR 403, 406. 
75 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options 
for possible locations for the archives of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the seat of the residual mechanism(s) for the 
Tribunals’ (21 May 2009) General S/2009/258 para 86 as cited by Adama Dieng ‘Capacity-Building 
Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy’ (2010) 9 NWUJIMR 403, 406. 
76 Diekmann (n 19) 107-108; Olympia Bekou, ‘Rule 11 bis: An examination of the process of referrals 
to national courts in ICTY jurisprudence’ (2009) 33 FILJ 723 726; Susan Somers, ‘Rule 11 bis of the 
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in the decision to transfer the cases.  Although there was no time limit in the 
resolution creating the ICTR, from the beginning it was clear that prosecution would 
not be a permanent task.77 Around the time of the establishment of the Completion 
Strategy, the Ad-Hoc tribunals were already viewed as being “too costly, too 
inefficient and too ineffective”78 as a mechanism for dealing with justice.79 By 2004, 
the tribunals had been described as “enormous and extremely costly bureaucratic 
machines.”80 The Ad-Hoc tribunals had a combined budget that exceeded $250 
million per annum and represented more than 10 per cent of the total annual UN 
regular budget.  There was also a sentiment of donor fatigue, which caused financial 
crisis at the ICTY in June 2004, leading to a hiring freeze imposed by the UN 
Secretariat.81 Not only was there an enormous expenditure, there were also such 
lengthy delays in trials that questions were “raised as to the violation of the tribunals 
of the basic human rights guarantees set out in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).”82  Indeed, it has even been argued that the origins of 
the Completion Strategy can be traced to the budget of the tribunals.83 Specifically, 
links have been made with the Completion Strategy and political dialogues between 
states and various UN institutions that questioned the efficiency of the Ad-Hoc 
tribunals.84  For example, in 2000, the Expert Group appointed by the Secretary-
General found that until the process of winding down started, the financial resources 
required to fund the Tribunals could not be reduced.85  These links have been argued 
to show the “obvious concern motivating the development of the Completion Strategy 
                                                                                                                                                              
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Referral of Indictments to National Courts’ 
(2007) 30 BCICLR 175 183. 
77 Eric Møse, ‘The ICTR’s Completion Strategy-Challenges and Possible Solutions’ (2008) 6 JICJ 667, 
667. 
78 See generally Ralph Zachlin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 2 JICJ 541, 
545. 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid 543. 
81 Dominic Raab, ‘Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy’ (2005) 3 JICJ 82, 96. 
82 Zachlin (n 78) 543; Raab (n 81) 88. 
83 Bingham gives the example of the origins Completion strategy being traced to a budgetary study 
where Kofi Annan appointed a group of experts in late 1990s to study the efficiency of the tribunals.  
Lara Bingham, ‘Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2005) 24 BJIL 687, 701.  
84 Bingham gives the example of then-President of the ICTY Claude Jorda observing that “[t]he 
Tribunal [was] at a turning point in its history,” and the time had come to “question the productivity 
and efficiency of the Tribunal,” and to identify a “time-frame… for fulfilling its mission.” ibid. 
85 Donlon (n 56) 356 referring to UNSC ‘Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the 
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (17 June 2000) UN Doc S/2000/597 para 35. 
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to be the price of international justice.”86  Notably, Justice Hunt of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber was concerned that the pressure to complete the mandate could promote 
infringements on the rights of the accused.87  In his dissenting opinion he expressed, 
“[T]his Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions it enters, or by the 
speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council 
has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials.”88  This thesis will therefore pay close 
attention to whether the transfer cases were decided appropriately, ensuring the 
conditions of fair trial and penalty in line with international standards or transferred 
prematurely based on budgetary concerns.   
 
According to Rule 11 bis, which governs the referral of cases to national jurisdictions, 
a Trial Chamber must be firstly satisfied that the court by which the case has 
jurisdiction.89  Therefore, part (A) of Rule 11 bis provides:  
If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the accused is in the custody of the 
Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial Chamber, which shall determine whether the 
case should be referred to the authorities of a State: 
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or  
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or  
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and able to accept such a case, so that those 
authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate court for trial within that 
State.90  
A Trial Chamber also has to be satisfied that there will be minimum standards for the 
accused.  As such, part (C) of Rule 11 bis provides: 
In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber 
shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned 
and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.91 
 
 
                                                         
86 ibid. 
87 Schabas (n 1) 43. 
88 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, (Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the 
Form of Written Statement (Majority Decision given 30 September 2003)) IT-02-54-AR73.4 (21 
October 2003) 22.  See also Sarah Williams, ‘ICTY Referrals to National Jurisdictions: A fair trial or a 
fair price?’ (2006) 17 CLF 177, 221 who argues “The savings to the international community resulting 
from a timely conclusion to the activities of the ICTY must not come at the price of fair trials to the 
defendants and overburdening fledgling judicial systems.’ 
89  RPE (n 10) Rule 11 bis. 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid. 
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Moreover, once the case has been transferred the ICTR will still retain some powers 
as well as transfer some powers to the national court.  Accordingly, part (D) of Rule 
11 bis provides:  
When an order is issued pursuant to this Rule: 
(i) the accused, if in the custody of the Tribunal, shall be handed over to the authorities 
of the State concerned; 
(ii) the Trial Chamber may order that protective measures for certain witnesses or 
victims remain in force; 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of the State all of the information 
relating to the case which the Prosecutor considers appropriate and, in particular, the 
material supporting the indictment; 
(iv) the Prosecutor may, and if the Trial Chamber so orders, the Registrar shall, send 
observers to monitor the proceedings in the State concerned.  The observers shall 
report, respectively, to the Prosecutor or through the Registrar to the President.92   
Lastly, once the case has been transferred, the order can be revoked.  Therefore, part 
(E) of Rule 11 bis provides:  
At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and before the accused is found guilty 
or acquitted by a court in the State concerned the opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and make a 
formal request for deferral within the terms of Rule 10. 93  
 
However, where indictments have not been confirmed, the Prosecutor does not need a 
judicial decision under Rule 11 bis to hand over the case file.  These decisions are 
made on the basis of cooperation between the ICTR Prosecutor and national 
prosecuting authorities.94   I will now turn to the procedural history of the transfer 
cases so the reader can understand when some challenges with the transfer cases have 
arisen and how the ICTR has attempted to alleviate them. 
 
2.2 The procedural history of the transfer cases 
In September 2003, the Prosecutor identified 40 cases that could be transferred to 
national jurisdictions for trial by Rule 11 bis.  From the outset he expressed concerns 
for Rwandan law prescribing the death penalty.95  This number was increased to 41 in 
                                                        
92 ibid. 
93 ibid. 
94 Møse (n 77) 672. 
95 UNSC ‘Letter dated 3 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council’ (6 October 2003) General S/2003/946 Annex para 23. 
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April 2004.96   The Rules of Procedure and Evidence were also changed so the 
transfer could be made to include any country that was willing and able to accept and 
prosecute the accused.97    The issue of the capacity of the Rwandan judicial system to 
handle the transfer cases was raised, since Rwanda was additionally faced with the 
process of adjudicating thousands of local cases connected with the genocide.98  As a 
part of the ICTR’s mandate to contribute to justice, stability and reconciliation, the 
ICTR Outreach Programme was created in 1995 to contribute to national 
reconciliation and strengthening of the Rwandan judicial system.99  The Outreach 
Programme included the training of jurists, advocates, human rights practitioners and 
awareness-raising programs within Rwanda.100  The Programme supported Resolution 
955 creating the ICTR, which emphasised the need for the international cooperation 
to strengthen the courts and judicial system of Rwanda.101  Notably, the Resolution 
called “on the international community to assist national jurisdictions, as part of the 
Completion Strategy, in improving their capacity to prosecute cases transferred from 
the ICTY and ICTR…”102 In 2004, the Registrar concluded an inspection of prison 
facilities and began to consider a prisoner transfer agreement. The President of the 
ICTR commented “since many of the cases earmarked for transfer are destined for                                                         
96 UNSC ‘Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 
January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (3 May 2004) 
General S/2004/341 para 38 (Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council). 
97 Hassan B Jallow ‘Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda to the United Nations Security Council’ (UNSC, June 29 2004)  
<http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/.ictr.un.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1081> accessed 29 July 2013. 
98 Letter dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (n 96) para 38. 
99 Erik Møse ‘The International criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ in Bellelli Roberto (ed), International 
Criminal Justice Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to Its Review (1st edn, Ashgate Publishing 
Company 2010) 98 citing UNSC ‘Letter dated 23 May 2007 from the President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President 
of the Security Council’, (31 May 2007) General S/2007/2003 Annex 5. 
100 UNSC ‘Letter dated 29 May 2006 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 
January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (1 June 2006) 
General S/2006/358 Annex para 5. 
101 UNSC Res 955 (n 4) para 9 
102 ibid para 1. 
  17 
Rwanda, the issue of resources may therefore affect the proposed transfer of cases to 
Rwanda.   The transmitted cases would therefore have to await the resolution of these 
issues.”103  The Prosecutor also insisted on the compliance with international 
standards before the files would be transmitted.104  From very early in the transfer 
case history, the ICTR prepared for the transfer cases through capacity building of the 
Rwandan judiciary and improving prison facilities to international standards. 
 
By 2006, 30 unconfirmed case files had been handed over to Rwanda. The case-file of 
a suspect was also handed over to Belgium.105  Meanwhile, negotiations with other 
European States for the referral of further cases were being carried out.106  The 
transfer of Michel Bagaragaza to Norway was rejected by the Trial Chamber on 19 
May 2006 and upheld on Appeal on 30 August 2006,107 as Norway did not have the 
appropriate jurisdiction.108  The first successful decision to transfer an accused under 
Rule 11 bis was made for the transfer of Michel Bagaragaza to The Netherlands.  
However, the Dutch authorities considered they had no jurisdiction to try the accused 
and subsequently revoked the transfer.109  Two cases however, were subsequently 
successfully transferred to France having met the conditions of Rule 11 bis.110   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2004) General S/2004/921 para 38. 
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General S/2005/336 para 40. 
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Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for 
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January and 31 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (8 December 2006) 
General S/2006/951 para 33. 
106 Hassan Jallow ‘Statement by Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
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In December 2007, the Government of Rwanda submitted an amicus curiae brief to 
the ICTR requesting that one of the Accuseds Yussuf Munyakazi, be transferred to 
Rwanda for trial.111  The first five-referral requests including this case were denied on 
the basis of “the Trial Chamber’s concerns for the relative ambiguity about the 
applicable Rwandan law concerning the risk of solitary confinement, and the 
availability and protection of witnesses from both within and outside Rwanda.”112  
However, in 2007 Rwanda enacted legislation to exclude the application of the death 
penalty from transfer cases and also provided extensive guarantees for fair trial 
similar to the provisions of the ICTR.113  Subsequently, on the 3rd of November 2008, 
Rwanda amended its laws to exempt transferees from the ICTR and other States from 
the provisions of solitary confinement upon conviction.114  Also in 2008, the 
Government of Rwanda reported that a new prison had been built in Mpanga for 
transferred detainees with a special wing of 73 cells built to international standards.  
Moreover, during the trial, the accused would be detained in a custom-built remand 
facility in the Kigali Central Prison.115  
In early 2010, the Prosecutor filed three more referrals under Rule 11 bis.  During this 
time, capacity-building activities of the registry for the judiciary in Rwanda continued 
and Germany funded a video-link project for the Rwandan Supreme Court to increase 
the protection of witnesses.  The ICTR also provided training programmes on witness  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protection for personnel of the Rwandan judicial system.116  In 2010, the Security 
Council also established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(IRMCT), which would begin functioning on 1 July 2012.117   The IRMCT would be 
unable to issue new indictments118 and therefore only have power to conduct review 
proceedings, supervise the enforcement of sentences and decide to pardon or 
commute sentences.119  As a “small, temporary and efficient structure, whose 
functions and size will diminish over time with a small number of staff commensurate 
its reduced functions.”120  Just before the decision of the first of the next 3 referrals 
the, Prosecutor commented that “a determination of the referral of the cases of seven 
of the 10 fugitives to national jurisdiction for trial will clearly impact on the 
Tribunal’s Completion Strategy as well as on the design, timing, size, and cost of the 
international residual mechanism expected to inherit the residual functions of the 
tribunal.”121  Notably in 2013, the average duration of time between custody and 
judgment at the ICTR was 5.9 years.122  The final stages of the transfer case decisions 
saw further capacity building for the judiciary of Rwanda but also the considerable 
down sizing of the ICTR by the establishment of IRMCT.  However, it is 
questionable whether capacity building efforts will have an impact only on the 
handful of Transfer cases or will improve the situation of the Rwandan judicial 
system as a whole for domestic cases. 
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In a landmark decision on the 28th June 2011, the ICTR Referral Chamber granted the 
request of the Prosecutor in the case of Uwinkindi123 to be referred to Rwanda for 
trial.  The Chamber had been satisfied with the legal framework in Rwanda, capacity 
building efforts to improve the legal system of Rwanda, as well as the arrangements 
the Prosecutor had made to monitor the trial in Rwanda.  This decision resulted in the 
filing of the referral of the remaining cases.  At this time, there were only two 
detainees at the ICTR left to be tried, with the rest being fugitives at large.124  To 
ensure fairness of trial, the Chamber decided that the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights (hereinafter ACHPR) would monitor the case of Uwinkindi when 
adjudicated in the Rwandan courts.125  Moreover, if the ICTR were not satisfied with 
the Rwandan court system, it would still retain the right to revoke permission for 
Rwanda to try the transfer cases.126   However, the President of the ICTR was unable 
to reach an agreement with the ACHPR and a stay of proceedings was ordered on the 
transfer of Uwinkindi until a suitable mechanism for monitoring was put into place.127  
The President of the Tribunal also issued additional guidelines for the monitoring 
mechanism to ensure uniform practices are followed after referral.128  The case of 
Uwinkindi was expected to commence in late 2013 with pre-trial proceedings being 
undertaken by trial monitors of the ICTR.  However, negotiations with the ACHPR, 
regarding the monitoring were still continuing.129  By 1 July 2012, the Office of the 
Prosecutor assumed certain court monitoring functions for cases transferred by the 
ICTR to national jurisdictions.  The First Annual Report of the (IRMCT) confirmed  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that the preliminary proceedings in referred Uwinkindi case had begun before the 
Kigali High Court.130 Moreover, the Prosecutor had appointed a court monitor to 
observe the proceedings in the Munyagishari case, which had also been transferred to 
Rwanda for trial.131    
 
2.3 The challenges of the transfer cases 
From the creation of the ICTR, decisions at the inception of the tribunal as to its 
location would already sketch the challenges the ICTR could face if it decided to 
transfer cases back to Rwanda.  From the initial UNSC Resolution, the Secretary 
General would already determine that Rwanda was not neutral territory to hold trials 
and this meant there were high security risks.  Therefore, trials held in Rwanda may 
not guarantee an impartial and independent trial.  With the genocide recently 
subsided, this author believes it would have been difficult for the victorious RPF 
government to make impartial decisions, the Defence Counsel for the Accused 
(Hereinafter the Defence) to secure witnesses to testify, or for Rwanda to guarantee 
that the death penalty would not be used.  This opinion is particularly supported 
where Rwanda voted against the creation of the ICTR because the death penalty 
would not be implemented.   
 
Of note is the tumultuous relationship between the Rwandan government and the 
ICTR that would delay the movement of witnesses in 2002.  This disagreement, just 
one year before the Security Council resolutions to transfer cases back to Rwanda as a 
part of the Completion Strategy, raises concerns as to whether the Rwandan courts 
could adjudicate an independent decision without interference by the Rwandan 
government.  However, the time gap between the inception of the tribunal and the 
transfer cases, as well as capacity building and law reform by the Rwandan 
government to improve the judicial culture and legal system could offset these 
concerns.  The decision of Uwinkindi, almost two decades after the ICTR’s inception 
could mean that Rwandan territory is now to be considered a neutral location to hold 
trials.  Although there is also the question of whether capacity building of the 
Rwandan judiciary system and changes to the Rwandan penalty system will have an                                                         
130 UNSC,‘First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ (n 33) 
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impact on the overall fair trial and penalty in Rwanda.  Or rather, only improve the 
fair trial standards for the very few transfer cases.   
 
Moreover, an overarching concern is certainly how the decision to transfer cases has 
fit with the Completion Strategy of the ICTR.  Perhaps the referral of cases as a 
means to an end could have been decided prematurely without a clear confirmation of 
adequate fair trial standards and a penalty in line with international standards.  With 
donor fatigue, an extraordinary budget and lengthy trials a major concern is whether 
the decision that cases could have been transferred back to Rwanda was made due to 
financial pressures.  Notably, it is also concerning that after failed negotiations with 
the ACPHR, the monitor was appointed by the Office of the Prosecutor, which 
strongly advocated the transfer of the cases to Rwanda rather than an impartial body.  
However, to what extent should we draw the line as to how far decisions of the ICTR 
should go to ensure fair trial and conditions of detention up to international standards 
without becoming condescending or patronising towards the Rwanda?  Schabas took 
the view that the decisions of the ICTR have been “somewhat patronising”132 as well 
as “humiliating for Rwanda who has made great strides in order to modernise its 
justice system as inspired by international standards.”133  However, with the 
prosecution of international crimes moving towards the domestic sphere,134 it will be 
more important than ever before to show an unwavering stance that national 
prosecutions should adhere to recognised fair trial standards.   
 
Indeed, “as the final chapters on the Ad-Hoc International Criminal Tribunals are 
being written, it will be extremely important to balance competing values -
accountability for the perpetrators, ensuring that the perpetrators receive a fair and 
expeditious trial, and ensuring justice for the victims and their families.”135 In other 
words, although it may appear preferable for international criminal justice to try the 
“small fish” before national criminal courts for the end result of justice,136 the conduct  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of a trial in a fair manner should not be compromised.  As Johnson has eloquently 
described the Completion Strategy “makes sense as policy planning for the tribunal’s 
closure, but dangers exist: treating the target dates mechanistically; referring cases of 
senior-level accused to a domestic court; and referring cases to domestic jurisdictions 
that are not capable of conducting fair trials.  Impunity could result.  The successful 
completion of the Tribunal’s work can be achieved only if it realized in a manner that 
maintains the highest standards of international human rights and due process, and 
excludes impunity.”137  
 
In what follows, I will analyse the three areas, namely the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, witness protection and availability and the applicable 
penalty, which the ICTR Chambers found to have negated transfer in the initial 
decision of Munyakazi.138   I will then address the concern, which has been identified 
by the monitor in the aftermath of the transfer cases.  That is, the payment Defence 
Legal Aid funding and the impact on the right of the Accused to an effective defence. 
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3.  The Independence of the Rwandan judiciary 
 
Under the transfer Rule 11 bis, a Trial Chamber has to be satisfied that the accused 
will receive a fair trial.139  International legal instruments such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) state under procedural obligations to 
ensure the right to fair trial, that an accused “should be entitled to a hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.”140  Moreover, according to the Constitution of 
the Republic of Rwanda, “Every person of a crime shall be presumed innocent until 
his or her guilt has been conclusively proved in accordance with the law in a public, 
and fair hearing…”(emphasis added).141  The Transfer Law, which Rwanda had 
passed to include Rule 11 bis in its legislation and to facilitate the transfer cases,142 
has reinforced this guarantee.143   
 
During the history of the ICTR the current political party, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (hereinafter RPF)144 has interfered with the prosecution of former RPF members 
involved in the 1994 Genocide.  There has been little to no accountability for these 
crimes.145  Indeed, Carla del Ponte, the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR has 
complained of “political pressure from Rwanda designed to prevent her investigating 
military abuses carried out by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.”146  In fact, she was 
encouraged to prosecute those who committed the genocide but not the war crimes 
carried out by the soldiers of both side.  She claims that this led to her removal from 
her post as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR.147  For example, in response to the 
suspension of cooperation of Rwanda with the ICTR in 2002 (as discussed previously 
in Chapter 2), the Prosecutor felt that the true reason was not the manner by which the 
witnesses were being treated, but that “powerful elements within Rwanda strongly  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23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 para 1. 
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oppose the investigation by the Prosecutor, in the execution of the Tribunal mandate, 
of crimes allegedly committed by members of the RPF Patriotic Army in 1994” and 
therefore, the Rwandan authorities were accused of having no genuine political will to 
provide assistance.148  Due to the interference by the Rwandan government in the 
prosecution of former RPF members throughout the history of the ICTR, it is of 
concern that the Rwandan government could influence the Rwandan Judiciary when 
adjudicating the transfer cases.  
 
Indeed, the tribunal’s lack of enforcement power has been reasoned by scholars to 
give the government of Rwanda “wide latitude to withhold the vital assistance the 
tribunals needed to investigate atrocities, issue indictments and prosecute war crimes 
suspects,” therefore giving the victor government the ability to control who is 
prosecuted.149  For example in 2008, upon transfer of the ICTR’s investigations into 
RPF crimes to Rwanda for domestic prosecution, the Rwandan Prosecutor General 
indicted four senior military officers of the RPF in connection to the killings of 
several clergy of the Kabgayi Parish in June 1994.  On the 24th October 2008, the 
military court acquitted two commanding officers and convicted subordinates officers 
to 8 years imprisonment on the 24th of October 2008.150  It is arguable that this was a 
symbol that Rwanda was ready to make unbiased decisions by showing readiness to 
prosecute both sides of the genocide.  However, scholars have described this trial as 
“a sham trial that ignored crucial evidence in an apparent attempt to shield senior RPF 
members from criminal responsibility.”151  
More recently the wide interpretation of laws criminalising genocide ideology and 
discrimination and sectarianism,152 by the Rwandan government would be a major 
concern.  These laws which were introduced to restrict speech deemed to promote  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hatred in the years following the 1994 genocide,153 have been largely misused to 
“criminalise criticism of the government and legitimate dissent by opposition politics, 
human rights activists and journalists” particularly in the lead up to the 2010 
elections.154  The independence and impartiality of the Rwandan judiciary would 
therefore be a concern for the ICTR in deciding whether the remaining cases could be 
transferred.   
 
I will now turn to an analysis of the decisions of the ICTR on the issue of the 
independence of the Rwandan judiciary.  This analysis will discuss the case law 
chronologically.  It will begin with the first group of decisions of the Trial Chamber 
and their relative appeal decisions and then turn to the next group of transfer case 
decisions and their relative appeal decisions.155 
 
3.1 The decisions of the ICTR on the independence of the Judiciary 
The issue of independence and impartiality of the Rwandan judiciary was first 
discussed in the decision that denied the transfer of the case of Yussuf Munyakazi to 
Rwanda in May 2008.156  The Defence raised concerns that a single judge would 
adjudicate the trial in Rwanda.157 The Trial Chamber agreed, expressing apprehension 
that in light of a tendency of the Rwandan government to pressure the judiciary, this 
would mean that a single judge would be particularly susceptible.158  The Chamber 
found that although Rwandan legislation enshrined the principle of judicial 
independence, the Rwandan Government’s interrupted cooperation with the Tribunal, 
as well as negative reactions to foreign judges for indicting former members of the  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RPF “somewhat troubling.”159  In particular, the Rwandan Government in a series of 
strongly critical official statements160 had previously condemned a French judge for 
issuing arrest warrants against former RPF members.161  The Rwandan Government 
was also critical of a Spanish judge during a Referral Hearing when a Human Rights 
Watch (hereinafter HRW) representative had stated that a Spanish indictment had 
been issued against forty high-ranking RPF officers.  The Rwandan Government 
representative at the hearing denied this, stating “there is no such thing as a resolution 
by the Rwandan Parliament to prosecute a Spanish judge.”162  Overall, the Trial 
Chamber found that safeguards to the impartiality and independence of the judiciary 
provided under Rwandan law to have not been met in the reality of past practice and 
that if the case was transferred, it could be subjected to indirect pressure from the 
Rwandan Government.163 This was considered especially due to the trial being placed 
within the territory where the crimes occurred.164  Therefore in Munyakazi, examples 
where the Rwandan government had attempted to pressure the judiciary of the ICTR, 
was considered by the Trial Chamber to override the guarantees of independence and 
impartiality in the Transfer Law and the Constitution of the Republic Rwanda. 
 
However one month later in June 2008, in the decision of Kanyarukiga, the 
contention that there was an inclination for the Rwandan government to influence the 
judiciary was placed aside.165  Although the Trial Chamber accepted that the concept 
of judicial independence was relatively new in Rwanda, it decided that this did not 
bear specific effect on the High Court or the Supreme Court, which would be 
adjudicating the transfer cases. It was decided that illustrations provided by HRW and 
International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (hereinafter ICDAA) were too 
general in nature and did not focus specifically on the High Court or Supreme Court, 
which would adjudicate the transfer cases.166   The Trial Chamber of Kanyarukiga 
rejected submissions by HRW, which questioned executive interference in practice167  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particularly in the case of the President of Rwanda’s leading role in the appointment 
of judges.  Executive involvement in judicial appointments was found to exist in 
many countries and doesn’t in itself mean lack of independence.168  Not accepted, was 
the amicus curiae brief of the ICDAA, which reported that there had been a tendency 
that higher positions of the judiciary were filled with members of the Tutsi ethnicity.  
The Trial Chamber rejected the reasoning that the tendency to fill higher positions of 
the judiciary with Tutsis who might have personally suffered from the genocide 
implies that the Rwandan Judiciary could not provide a “sufficiently calm and 
dispassionate climate.”169  The Trial Chamber dismissed these claims on the basis of 
having no statistical information and looking to the many accused of Hutu origin that 
had been acquitted.170  The Trial Chamber accepted a statistic given by the Counsel 
for Rwanda that referred to an acquittal rating of close to 40%.171  Of note, the history 
of interference by the Rwandan government to pressure the judiciary of the ICTR was 
not addressed in this decision.172 
 
The subsequent decision of the Trial Chamber in the case of Hategekimana173 agreed 
with the previous decision in Kanyarukiga.174 The submissions of HRW were based 
on interviews with present and former jurists that argued that the Rwandan judiciary 
lacked independence.  These submissions referred to a select number of specific 
examples were considered to only involve a “limited number of cases over a large 
period of several years where the Rwandan ordinary courts have been dealing with 
large numbers of cases.”175 Moreover, concerns expressed by former members of the 
Rwandan judiciary lacked specific examples and context.176  The Trial Chamber also 
explained that it was within the transfer rules of Rule 11 bis and various human rights 
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treaties to have one judge.177  Further, the Trial Chamber held that the President’s role 
in choosing the judiciary was not absolute.  Thereby, the President merely proposes 
potential judges and the members of the Supreme Court and the Senate ultimately 
elect them.178   Notably in a shift in reasoning, the Trial Chamber decided that the 
reactions of the Rwandan government to investigations by foreign judges into crimes 
committed by the RPF were instead reactions to the rulings of foreign courts.179 
 
The emphasis on specific practice was reiterated by the Trial Chamber in the 
subsequent decision of Gatete,180 who again expressed a lack of statistical information 
and decided that irrespectively, the exact composition of the High Court and Supreme 
Court would not prevent transfer as the acquittal rate in Rwanda was considerable.  
The Trial Chamber referred to the same acquittal rate of 40% employed in the 
previous decision of Kanyarukiga.181  The Trial Chamber once more declared that 
examples given by the amici to be too general, not specifically focusing on the High 
Court.182  When discussing the concerns of a trial being conducted by a single judge, 
the Trial Chamber reiterated that this “clearly does not prevent transfer” as there was 
no information available that an acquittal rating was lower in such trials.183   
 
Finally, the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Munyakazi184 reversed the finding by 
the Trial Chamber that had previously concluded the safeguards provided in Rwandan 
Law of the impartiality and independence of the judiciary was not a reality in past 
practice.185  In regards to arguments made by the Defence that a single judge is 
incompatible with the right to a fair trial, the Appeals Chamber reiterated that 
international legal instruments such as the ICCPR186 do not require that a trial or an 
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appeal to be heard by a certain number of judges to be fair and independent.187  The 
Appeals Chamber was not swayed by the Opinion of the Consultative Council of 
European Judges and noted their opinion to be merely recommendatory.188  The 
Consultative Council recommended that where a panel of professional judges hears a 
trial, “the number of judges should be kept to a minimum, with a single judge 
wherever the degree of seriousness of the case allows.”189  As the transfer cases are of 
a serious nature where defendants are accused of being the main planners and 
organisers of genocide a single judge may not be always appropriate. 
 
The Appeals Chamber did not agree with judgment of the Trial Chamber of the 
decision in Munyakazi, that a single judge could be more susceptible to outside 
pressure,190 as it held there was no evidence on the record in this particular case that 
single judge trials in Rwanda had been more susceptible to outside interference or 
pressure particularly by the Rwandan Government, than previous trials involving 
panels of judges.191  The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had erred in 
its consideration that there was a serious risk of government interference with the 
judiciary in Rwanda.  In that regard, Trial Chamber’s previous reasoning was based 
on nine years old examples. The Appeals Chamber concluded that examples of 
reactions of the Rwandan government to foreign judges were considered too old.  The 
Appeals Chamber pointed to the fact that the ICTR acquitted five persons and that 
Rwanda did not suspend its cooperation with the tribunal as a result of these 
acquittals.  The Appeals Chamber reasoned that the reaction of the Rwandan 
government to foreign indictments did not necessarily indicate how Rwanda would 
react to rulings by its own courts.192   
 
The Appeals Chamber did not find supporting evidence from the amicus curiae 
relating to the independence of the Rwandan judiciary to be specific enough.    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For example, a report citing the 2007 United State Department Report, referring 
primarily to the Gacaca cases rather than the High Court or Supreme Court.193  
Finally, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber did not take into account 
the availability of monitoring to ensure that the independence, impartiality or 
competence of the Rwandan judiciary was upheld.194  Therefore, the Appeals 
Chamber granted this ground of appeal and concluded that the Government of 
Rwanda respects the independence of the judiciary and that the composition of the 
courts in Rwanda did meet the right to be tried by an independent tribunal.195  The 
issue of the independence and the impartiality of the judiciary from this case seemed 
to be largely resolved.  As a consequence of this judgment the Defence did not appeal 
the issue of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, in the subsequent 
appeal decisions of Kanyarukiga196 and Hategekimana,197 which discussed other 
issues that held back the transfer of these cases. Moreover, the trial decision of Gatete 
was not appealed.198  However, after the Appeals Chamber decision in Munyakazi, 
challenges to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary have been 
nevertheless raised in different cases, which will be discussed below. 
 
Despite these challenges, the decision in the case of Uwinkindi199 confirmed that the 
Rwandan judiciary was independent and impartial enough to meet the fair trial 
standard for a transfer of case to Rwanda.  The Trial Chamber reiterated that past 
practice in Rwanda had to be highly specific to prove otherwise. Submissions from 
the defence, HRW, ICDAA and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers 
(Hereinafter the IADL), a non-governmental organization with consultative status to 
Economic and Social Council and United Nations Educational and Scientific 
Organization200 were not considered specific enough.  Particularly, the Trial Chamber  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found that these examples were mostly of a political nature, which “does not 
necessarily reflect the conditions of the trial or the charges.”201  Allegations of 
corruption by the Defence and HRW were set aside. For example, a recent public 
address by the President of the Supreme Court, where transfer cases would be 
adjudicated, which described the justice sector as “very prone to corruption” were 
found by the Trial Chamber as not enough to conclude the Rwandan judiciary was 
unduly corrupt. 202  This opinion was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber,203 which 
found there was neither any evidence of external influence and corruption or that the 
Accused could support that his case would be “uniquely susceptible to interference” 
or support this submission of a “deteriorating political climate.”204  Therefore, it was 
confirmed that Rwanda met the condition of independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary to transfer the case.205  
 
Since the Appeal of Uwinkindi, there have been seven cases that have been 
transferred to Rwanda, which found the Rwandan judiciary to be able to conduct a 
fair trial.206  Notably, in the subsequent transfer case of Kanyishema,207 the 
Prosecution had indicated that Rwanda had engaged in capacity building programmes 
reinforcing the competencies and skills of judges, which the Trial Chamber 
accepted.208  On the other hand, the ICDAA also argued that in 2008, the Rwandan 
Constitution was amended so that judges no longer had the security of tenure for life  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but were now subject to evaluation, which could make them subject to making 
decisions to ensure the renewal of their terms.209  However, the Trial Chamber 
disagreed, noting that the renewal of the terms of office is in the hands of the judicial 
body, which is independent of the executive and legislature.210  The prosecution also 
submitted that the Rwandan legal framework ensures independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary, which is separate from the legislative and executive branches of 
government.211  Notably, by this time, the Transfer Law had also been amended to 
offer the President of the Court the option of having “complex or important cases 
ruled by a quorum of three or more judges rather than one judge.”212  The Trial 
Chamber accepted this as well as examples from practice that showed the High Court 
convicting slightly over 200 cases and acquitting the remainder of the 283 criminal 
trials.213  The Prosecution also submitted that the High Court presided over 36 
genocide cases between 2006 and 2010, and the Supreme Court had heard 61 appeals 
or post-conviction proceedings in genocide cases between 2006 and 2008.214  
However, it would have been interesting to have information on which of these 
genocide cases resulted in an acquittal.  The same submissions were made in the case 
of Sikuwabo,215 where Trial Chamber upheld its previous reasoning.   
 
 In the case of Ntaganzwa,216 the Counsel for the Accused argued that “any person 
who is a citizen of Rwanda must have either witnessed or experienced or felt the 
commission of the alleged crimes” and therefore would lack to impartiality to try 
cases.217  The Trial Chamber noted that the Counsel did not provide any examples of 
bias.218  According to the Trial Chamber, it is well established in the ICTR 
jurisdiction that there exists a presumption of impartiality that attaches to a judge, 
derived from their oath at office as well as the qualification for their appointment.  
The Chamber was of the opinion that it must be assumed that judges can “disabuse  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their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions,” and that there is a 
“high threshold that must be reached in order to rebut the presumption of 
impartiality.”219  Referring the to ICTY Appeals Chamber judgment in the case of 
Furundzija, “partiality must be established on the basis of adequate and reliable 
evidence.”220  The Trial Chamber of the subsequent referral case of Ryandikayo,221 
Ndimbati,222 and Munyarugarama223 agreed.  For the Transfer Law and Rwandan 
Law to be overridden, the Trial Chamber reiterated that it needed highly specific 
examples of practice.224 
 
In the subsequent decision of Munyagishari,225 the Defence raised allegations that 
according to the former Prosecutor General and Vice President of the Supreme Court, 
the Rwandan judiciary is not independent of the RPF.226  The Defence gave the 
example of the trial of Victoria Ingabire to illustrate how the Supreme Court has been 
“used as a tool of oppression of government opponents.”227  The Prosecution argued 
that Victoria Ingabire was supported by a group wanted by the ICC and that the IADL 
failed to show how this trial might affect the case of the Accused.228  The Chamber 
considered the Defence’s argument as it relates to the trial of Victoria Ingabire 
unsubstantiated and that IADL failed to show the similarity between the Victoria 
Ingabire case and the case of the Accused.  The Chamber concluded it was not 
persuaded that the Accused would face trial before a non-independent and partial 
bench as a consequence of corruption and external influence.229  As the Victoria 
Ingabire case is the most recent example, which could shed light on the independence 
and impartiality of the Rwandan judiciary at present, I will discuss this example at 
length below.   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3.2 Evaluation 
The Trial Chamber in its decision of Munyakazi,230 was initially concerned that cases 
transferred to Rwanda could result in a decision influenced by the government of 
Rwanda. However, throughout the decisions of the transfer cases, the ICTR has 
indicated that allegations of government interference are not specific enough to rebut 
the presumption of independence and impartiality.  Although a panel of a single judge 
may mean that a judge may be more susceptible to influence, the Chamber argued this 
should not be a reason to deny transfer, as the aim of the Rule 11 bis statute is to 
determine whether the accused will receive a fair trial. Therefore, as the ICTR stated, 
a minimum number of judges is not a requirement of any international legal 
instrument as pre-requisite for a fair trial.  In any event, the transfer law has been 
amended so that the President of the Court has the option of having the case heard by 
a quorum of three or more judges. Indeed, as the ICTR has pointed out, the examples 
of the Rwandan government condemning decisions of the ICTR against former RPF 
members, given in the Munyakazi case in 2008 are outdated and cannot be relied upon 
today to give a true depiction of the Rwandan judicial system. 
 
However, a recent example of the Victoria Ingabire case, submitted by the Defence in 
2012, could indicate that the Rwandan judiciary may not be independent from the 
Rwandan government.   Amnesty International has shown concern as towards “the 
Rwandan judiciary’s capacity to deal with high profile political cases fairly and 
independently.”231 The trial of Victoria Ingabire, an opposition politician who 
returned to contest the 2010 elections,232 led to her conviction of 8 years in prison by 
the Supreme Court of Rwanda on 17 December 2012, a year after the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR Trial Chamber pronounced the judicial system to be impartial 
and independent.233   Her conviction was based on a speech, which referred to 
problems with reconciliation, and ethnic violence that she had made at the Genocide 
Memorial Centre.234  It is concerning that Ingabire was convicted based on the 
punishment of the crime of Genocide Ideology and Law N°4772001 of 18/12/2001 on  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Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and 
Sectarianism.235   
 
The Amnesty International report argued that the trial against Ingabire was biased, 
pointing to official statements made by the Rwandan authorities before the trial that 
came to pre-trial conclusions about the weight of evidence brought against her.236  
The report gave examples where the non-governmental organisation felt the judge 
was expressing favouritism towards the prosecution.  For example, during the trial, 
the judge “expressed surprise at the submission and complained about other purported 
examples of misconduct by the Defence.”  Amnesty International found these 
complaints not to be clearly linked to the defence’s submission.237 The judge in the 
case of Ingabire also reportedly, “expressed anger that the defence had not provided 
written submissions responding to the prosecution’s dossier earlier.”238  The report 
also described the judge telling the defence that the submission had been made in a 
“baric way” and when the defence interjected, the counsel was refused the right to 
respond to the concerns.239  The alleged favouritism towards the Prosecution in the 
Ingabire case, could be an indication of how the accused will be treated in the transfer 
cases.   
 
Also concerning is that in 2010, Ingabire’s defence lawyer, American professor Peter 
Erlinder, was also arrested and imprisoned for genocide denial, based on internet 
opinion pieces authored by Erlinder. A Rwandan police spokesman also pointed to 
statements that Erlinder had made at the ICTR and in publications.   Notably, Erlinder 
had also previously been the head of the ICTR defence team who had achieved 
Ntabakuze’s acquittal for “conspiracy to commit genocide.”240  During the Ntabakuze 
trial, Erlinder had publicised the UN “Rwandan Genocide Papers,” which were 
documents containing evidence of RPF-led executions of Hutu civilians.241   
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3.2.1 Reports of the monitor 
According to Rule 11 bis part D, the Prosecutor may send observers, and if the Trial 
Chamber so orders, the Registrar shall, send observers to monitor the proceedings in 
the State concerned.  The observers shall report, respectively, to the Prosecutor or 
through the Registrar to the President.242  Applying this rule, the Referral Chamber in 
the case of Uwinkindi, was persuaded that a robust monitoring mechanism would 
“ensure that any material violation of the fair trial rights of this Accused will be 
brought to the attention of the President of the Tribunal forthwith so that remedial 
action, including revoction, can be considered by this Tribunal.”243  After failed 
negotiations with ACHPR, the Office of the Prosecutor assumed court-monitoring 
functions for the transferred cases including the proceedings in the subsequently 
transferred Munyagishari case.244  It is in this author’s opinion that the Reports will 
carry more weight once the ICTR has designated an impartial body to carry out 
monitoring rather than the ICTR office of the Prosecutor, which strongly advocated 
for the transfer of the cases.    
 
  In November 2013, the President of the Mechanism made a decision regarding the 
monitoring mechanisms in the Uwinkindi and Munyagishari cases.245  This decision 
considered that “the monitors in the Uwinkindi and Munyagishari cases should limit 
themselves to providing objective information relevant to any possible violations or 
impediments to the fair trial rights of Mr. Uwinkindi and Mr. Munyagishari in their 
reports, and refrain from including in their reports any opinion, assessment, or 
conclusions regarding such violations or impediments unless otherwise directed.”246  
This is understandable since the monitor may not make an application for revocation 
and there is no duty imposed on the monitor to make an application.247  According to 
the Rules of the ICTR, the requests for revocation are to be submitted by the 
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Prosecutor.  However, the Chamber may grant other parties or entities standing to 
make such a request.248  
 
Since the transfer of Uwinkindi and Munyagashari, the Reports of the monitor have 
made observations of the hearings in Rwandan Courts.  Thus far, there has not been 
any indication of favoritism during the hearings.  For example, in the August 2012 
Report of the Court Monitor for the case of Uwinkindi, the monitor reported on a 
hearing fixed before the Intermediate Court of Nyarugenge on a bail application filed 
by the Accused.  According to the monitor, the judge provided equal opportunity for 
the parties to address the court at every stage of the proceeding when a new argument 
was taken up.249  Further, in the September 2012 report for the case of Uwinkindi, the 
monitor reported on a hearing fixed before a single judge of the Rwandan High Court 
to hear the Appeal against the decision by the Intermediate Court of Nyarugenge.    
The monitor noted that throughout the proceedings, the Judge intervened and asked 
questions to both the parties, and once a party had responded, allowed the opposite 
party to express its opinion on that question.250  Similarly, in the January 2013 report 
for the case of Uwinkindi, the monitor reported on a nine-member bench of the 
Supreme Court of Rwanda, which heard oral arguments from the parties.251  When the 
Defence argued that he was awaiting a response from the State about the 
constitutionality and jurisdiction of the High Court,252 the Court adjourned the case to 
enable the Defence to receive the State’s response before proceeding with his 
arguments.253  This was despite the Principle State Attorney from the Ministry of 
Justice arguing that he had already responded, noting that the registrar had verified his 
email.254  Moreover, in the March 2013 report for the case of Uwinkindi, where the 
Defence informed the Court that it was facing challenges that made it impossible to  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commence trial, the Chamber decided to give the Defence enough time to file 
submissions on all the obstacles it was facing before the trial. 255  
 
However, in the July-August 2013 Report of the monitor, the Accused stated that he 
would not receive justice in Rwanda because the prosecutors, the judges, and all those 
handling his case are of an ethnicity other than his.  Uwinkindi stated that he had been 
denied the right to presumption of innocence in Rwanda, as both the media coverage 
and the State authorities regularly proclaim his guilt for the alleged crimes.256  Also 
shedding doubt on the independence of the judiciary, in the January-February 2014 
Report of the monitor, the High Court decided to maintain charges of Complicity to 
Commit Genocide, even though these charges had been dropped from the Indictment 
by the ICTR, which could be of some concern.257   
 
The transfer cases from ICTR will involve former senior cabinet ministers, former 
military commanders, political leaders, journalists and senior businessmen who have 
played large role in organising the Rwandan genocide.258 As outlined above, Ingabire, 
a Rwandan opposition politician, has been convicted for genocide ideology where she 
has expressed concerns about problems with reconciliation and ethnic violence.   
Therefore, it is disconcerting that the Rwandan government could possibly influence 
the decision of a trial for a high-level organiser of the Rwandan genocide.  However, 
the conviction of Victoria Ingabire was two years ago and this author is not aware of 
recent examples on arrests for genocide ideology.  Only time will tell whether 
complaints from the Accused about the High Court maintaining charges of 
Complicity to Commit Genocide will have an impact on the impartiality of the overall 
judgment.  Moreover, this author does not believe that the ethnicity of the judges and 
prosecutor handling the case will affect the impartiality of the decision.  Thus far, the 
Reports of the Monitor have indicated that the judges have acted in an impartial                                                         
255 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi 1 to 31 March 2013’ (MICT, 12 April 
2013)   <http://unmict.org/files/cases/uwinkindi/other/en/130412_MarReport.pdf> accessed 17 March 
2014 paras 6, 9. 
256 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi July to August 2013’ (MICT, 12 
September 2013) <http://unmict.org/files/cases/uwinkindi/other/en/130912_JulyAugReport.pdf> para 
23. 
257 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi January-February 2014’, (MICT, 7 
March 2014)  <http://unmict.org/files/cases/uwinkindi/other/en/140307.pdf> accessed 17 March 2014 
para 67. 
258 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Detention of Suspects and Imprisonment of convicted 
persons The Detention Facility < http://www.unictr.org/tabid/114/default.aspx> accessed 20 April. 
  40 
manner throughout hearings conducted thus far.  Overall it is unlikely that the 
independence of Rwanda’s judiciary will be problematic for the Transfer cases. 
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4.Witness Availability and Protection 
 
Under International legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),259 “when determining any criminal charges, the Accused 
shall be entitled to minimum guarantee in full equity of examining, or have examine, 
the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses 
on his behalf under the same conditions against him.”260  This standard has been 
replicated in the statute of the ICTR.261  Moreover, since the Prosecution’s case is 
often solely based on witness testimonies at the ICTR, it is even more important for 
these testimonies to be credible.262  The importance of witness protection was already 
evident in earlier cases Akayesu and Rutaganda where two of the witnesses were 
murdered, as well as from reports of attacks against genocide survivors during 
1996.263 Notably, the ICTR has incorporated witness protection into its Statute 
including the conduct of video-link proceedings and the protection of the witness’s 
identity.264 The emphasis on witness protection can be seen from the extensive 
measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity of a witness. 
Particularly, a Trial Chamber of the ICTR can order the assigning of a pseudonym, 
altering of the image or voice of the testimony and holding of closed sessions.265 
Although the tribunal has been subject to criticisms relating to problems with 
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providing adequate witness protection,266 in contrast Gacaca, a local dispute 
resolution mechanism to try lower ranked persons, disclosed the full identities of 
witnesses within their local communities.267  As these tribunals were derived from 
traditional Rwandan community courts, by which the elders would sit on the grass 
and resolve community conflicts, witnesses did not have their identities shielded.268  
Therefore, some critics have suggested the ICTR needed to engage in a more careful 
and individualised analysis of witness protection, to balance a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial without undue delay with the protection of witnesses.269    
 
Rwanda’s Transfer Law includes similar provisions to the ICTR Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure, which facilitate witness testimony and provide witness protection.  
The High Court of Rwanda has the power to order measures of non-disclosure to the 
public of any documents or information,270 non-disclosure of victims and 
witnesses,271 and measures for the protection of victims and witnesses.272  Moreover, 
pursuant to Rwandan domestic law, the Prosecutor General of Republic of Rwanda 
can facilitate the witnesses in giving testimony including those living abroad, by the 
provision of appropriate immigration documents, personal security as well as medical 
and psychological assistance.273  The government has also provided “immunity from 
search, seizure, arrest or detention during their testimony and during their travel to 
and from the trials” for witnesses travelling from abroad.274  However, the High Court 
of Rwanda can also impose reasonable conditions on the witness, such as “limitations 
of movements in the country, duration of stay and travel.”275 
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4.1 The decisions of the ICTR on Witness Availability and Protection 
 
Despite the regulations mentioned above, the Defence in Munyakazi argued that the 
guarantees under Rwanda’s Transfer Law did not correspond to the reality in Rwanda, 
where defence witnesses have been harassed and risk both violence and assassination 
for testifying.276  Despite video-link facilities for witnesses from abroad and a witness 
protection unit established by the Rwandan government,277 the ICDAA submitted that 
Rwandan witnesses believed the Rwandan authorities would breach protective 
mechanisms provided for under the Transfer Law.278  Therefore, it would be 
“extremely unlikely” that defence witnesses would feel secure enough to testify.  The 
ICDAA agreed that witnesses in Rwanda risked being rejected by their community, 
mistreatment and arrest.279  It was their contention that Rwandan authorities would 
not be able to provide services comparable to the ICTR for witnesses from abroad.280   
HRW agreed, submitting that the witness protection service was understaffed, and 
witnesses were unlikely to use the service due to administrative problems.  Also, they 
argued there were no mechanisms in Rwanda to facilitate safe travel from abroad.281  
As most defence witnesses would come from abroad to testify, this would result in the 
majority of defence witnesses being affected.282 
 
The Trial Chamber agreed that it is likely that the rights for witnesses would be 
violated.283  For witnesses inside Rwanda, the Chamber was concerned primarily for 
their safety and therefore the difficulty the Accused would have in securing defence 
witnesses.  Particularly of concern were reports of murdered witnesses where at least 
eight genocide survivors had been murdered in 2007, with some killings relating to 
testimonies survivors had given.  Additionally, a US State Department Report stated 
that during 2006 there were between 12 and 20 genocide survivors killed and 328 
incidents of violence involving Gacaca trials.284  Moreover, the Trial Chamber was 
also concerned that defence witnesses may fear being accused of “genocide ideology”                                                         
276 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 29) para 51. 
277 ibid para 53. 
278 ibid para 55. 
279 ibid. 
280 ibid. 
281 ibid para 56. 
282 ibid para 57. 
283 ibid para 59. 
284 ibid para 61. 
  44 
(Discussed in Chapter 3) or arrested upon their return to Rwanda, as documented by 
HRW.285  Further, the Chamber felt that the Rwandan witness protection program was 
understaffed employing only 16 people and speculated that defence witness may not 
consider the Prosecutor and the police administering the program, as neutral bodies.  
They would therefore refrain from using the service.286 
 
For defence witnesses coming from outside of Rwanda, the main concern was that 
these witnesses would fear intimidation and threats, and arrest.287  Another problem 
was that under the ICTR’s Statute,288 the Accused has the benefit to obtain the 
cooperation of States with regard to securing the attendance or evidence of witnesses.  
The Trial Chamber felt that Rwanda on the other hand, did not have any mutual 
assistance or cooperation with other states.289  Finally, the Trial Chamber found that 
video-link facilities would not be a complete solution for witnesses from abroad.  
Since the majority of defence witnesses would be heard via video link, and the 
majority for the Prosecution witnesses heard in person, this would undermine the 
Accused’s right to examine witnesses under the same conditions.290  The Trial 
Chamber therefore concluded that the Accused’s fair trial right to obtain the 
attendance of, and to examine, defence witnesses under the same conditions as 
witnesses called by the Prosecution could not be guaranteed.291  This initial decision 
highlights the understaffed nature of the witness protection program as well as fears 
the witnesses hold of harassment, murder and arrest. 
 
Despite the negative decision in Munyakazi one month later in the decision of 
Kanyarukiga,292 the Chamber was satisfied with protective measures in the Rwandan 
Transfer Law.293  However, interviews submitted by HRW showed that Rwandan 
provisions of protection were not widely known and applied by legal practitioners. 
The Trial Chamber rejected this argument, as it related to knowledge of the law in the  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ordinary courts and not the Transfer law.294  Moreover, where HRW and ICDAA, as 
well as the previous Trial Chamber had concluded the Rwandan witness protection 
service was lacking in resources with only 16 staff members,295 the Trial Chamber 
pointed to the 900 witnesses who had been subject to this protection service.   
According to the Trial Chamber, capacity also depends on the priority given to 
particular cases.296  Instances of threats, harassment and violence, including 10 cases 
of defence witnesses before the tribunal being purportedly arrested, re-arrested and 
subjected to worse conditions of incarceration297 were not considered to represent the 
“large majority of witnesses which have testified without such consequences.”298 
Therefore, the Trial Chamber did not find that witnesses in general, faced risks if they 
testified in transfer proceedings.  The Trial Chamber concluded if such an incident 
should occur, the High Court or Supreme Court could initiate an investigation. 
Moreover, if these measures were insufficient, the monitoring mechanism would take 
charge.299    
 
However, overall the Trial Chamber found that witnesses may be deterred from 
testifying and therefore the Accused would not have an equal opportunity to call 
defence witnesses.  HRW and ICDAA submitted that defence witnesses might not 
seek assistance from the witness protection service as the Rwandan witness protection 
service refers all cases of threats to the local police.  The Trial Chamber found that 
this might reduce the willingness of some potential defence witnesses to testify.300  
Also, the Trial Chamber could not exclude that some potential defence witnesses in 
Rwanda may be fearful of testifying as they may be accused of harbouring “genocide 
ideology.”301  This is particularly because the concept has been given such a wide 
interpretation.302  Although the Trial Chamber was satisfied with the legal framework 
regarding witnesses abroad, particularly the immunity of defence witnesses from 
arrest and detention, it was also persuaded by submissions by the Defence and HRW  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that many Rwandans living abroad were afraid to testify in Rwanda.303  This fear 
included many Rwandans believing that the immunity guaranteed by law was a 
falsehood to facilitate their later arrest and forced returns to Rwanda.304  These fears 
were particularly exacerbated when the Rwandan Minister of Justice in February 
2007, stated that immunity for witnesses “will be a step toward their being captured.  
They will have to sign affidavits on which their current address will be shown and 
that would at any other time lead to their arrest.”305  The Trial Chamber was also 
concerned that Rwanda had not taken steps to conclude conventions about mutual 
assistance in criminal matters.306  The Trial Chamber agreed with the decision in 
Munyakazi307 that if most or all witnesses from the Defence were heard by video-
link,308 their testimony risked being less weighty.309   This is because it would be 
more difficult for the bench to assess their credibility, and for the Accused and parties 
to follow the evidence and proceedings.310 Overall, although the Trial Chamber was 
satisfied by the witness protection system in Rwanda but decided that the fear of 
being accused of “genocide ideology” could be a large deterrence for witnesses to 
testify for the Defence. 
 
The subsequent Trial Chamber in Hategekimana reiterated the previous Trial 
Chamber reasoning and findings.311  Additionally to the previous decisions the 
Defence, HRW and ICDAA offered examples of witnesses who had been threatened, 
harassed or arrested after testifying on behalf of the accused in ordinary or Gacaca 
courts.312  Also, HRW provided examples from witnesses stating they would not be 
willing to testify for fear of being prosecuted under genocide ideology laws.313 
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Moreover, the Defence pointed to witnesses living outside Rwanda claiming refugee 
status that may prevent them from returning to Rwanda.314  
 
In the Appeal of Munyakazi, the Appeals Chamber upheld that witnesses might be 
unwilling to testify for the Defence due to considerable information of harassment, 
fear of being indicted to face trial before Gacaca courts or being accused of genocide 
ideology.315  The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber did not err when it 
decided that Rwanda’s witness protection service currently lacked resources and was 
understaffed.  This was a step back from the previous decision in Kanyarukiga, where 
the Trial Chamber determined the service to have satisfactory capacity.316  The 
Appeals Chamber in the case of Munyakazi agreed with Trial Chamber in the case of 
Kanyarukiga about concerns that threats of harassment are reported to the police, 
which witnesses may not trust as impartial.  Therefore the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that this could mean that witnesses might be afraid to avail themselves for 
this service.317  The Appeals Chamber agreed there was sufficient information before 
the Trial Chamber that many witnesses residing outside Rwanda would be afraid to 
testify in Rwanda despite protections available under Rwandan law.318 It also upheld 
that video-link facilities were not a complete satisfactory solution to the testimony of 
witnesses outside Rwanda.319   
 
However, the Appeals Chamber in the case of Munyakazi found that the Trial 
Chamber in the case of Kanyarukiga320 overlooked several mutual assistance 
agreements with states in the region and elsewhere in Africa, and that cooperation had 
been arranged with other states.321  The Appeals Chamber also felt that the Trial  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Chamber should have taken into consideration monitoring provisions where the 
Prosecutor of the ICTR could send observers to monitor proceedings.  The Prosecutor 
could revoke the transfer order and make a formal request for deferral if not satisfied 
with proceedings.322  However, this error was not enough to invalidate the findings.323  
The Appeals Chamber in Kanyarukiga agreed with the previous decisions, denying 
transfer.324 The Chamber concluded that Kanyarukiga might face difficulties in 
obtaining witnesses residing within Rwanda because they would be afraid to testify.  
Moreover, he might not be able to call witnesses residing outside of Rwanda.325  The 
subsequent Trial Chamber decision of Gatete and Hategekimana also followed 
similar reasoning326 and came to the same conclusion327 to deny transfer on the basis 
of the Accused not being afforded the equal opportunity as the Prosecution to call 
witnesses. 
 
However, the Trial Chamber in the decision of Uwinkindi changed its opinion on the 
ability of the Accused to call witnesses.  Since the previous decisions, which denied 
transfer, Article 13 of the Rwandan Transfer law had been amended to include 
immunity for anything said or done during the course of the trial of a transferred case.  
Also, all witnesses who travel from abroad to Rwanda to testify in the trial of 
transferred cases shall now have immunity from search, seizure, arrest or detention 
during their testimony and their travel to and from the trials.328  Article 14 of the 
Transfer law had also been amended to provide witnesses residing abroad the option 
of testifying in Rwanda or in a foreign jurisdiction.  Moreover, there was also the 
option of testifying by video-link hearing taken by the judge at trial or by a judge in a 
foreign jurisdiction.329  Further, the witness protection unit would now be run within  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the Supreme Court and High Court rather than the Rwandan police.330  Rwanda 
submitted that in regards to criticisms of the ambiguity of laws against genocide 
ideology, it had commissioned a study to deal with the potential problems and said 
that there was no reason to believe that Rwanda’s judiciary would not fairly and 
impartially interpret the law.331   Nevertheless, the Kigali Bar Association (hereinafter 
the KBA) submitted that there was not a single case where a defence witness had been 
charged for harbouring genocide ideology332 and they had no difficulty in convincing 
witnesses to testify for the Defence.333  The concern therefore becomes whether 
providing immunity for defence witnesses as well as other options for witnesses to 
testify will ensure that an Accused has the equal opportunity to examine witnesses 
under the same conditions as the Prosecution. 
 
In contrast, the Defence submitted that none of his witnesses were willing to appear at 
all if the case was transferred to Rwanda334 for fear of being harassed, victimised by 
the Rwandan authorities, repercussions for their relatives.  They were also terrified of 
Rwandan laws on genocide denial.335  According to HRW, this unwillingness to 
testify increased as a result of political events within Rwanda in 2010 where 
opposition leaders Bernard Ntaganda and Victoria Ingabire were arrested for 
“genocide ideology” in the lead up to the parliamentary election (Discussed in 
Chapter 3).  HRW confirmed that witnesses feared repercussions for their 
testimony.336  The ICDAA reiterated, “the Government of Rwanda’s campaign 
against genocide denial and related crimes has proven to be the most significant 
obstacle in securing defence testimony in genocide cases.”337  However, the 
Prosecution provided statistics that 40% of the prosecutions for genocide ideology 
between 2008 and 2010 resulted in acquittals.  Moreover, Rwanda had introduced 
new legislation that would allow the panel for any case referred for trial in Rwanda to 
include judges from foreign or international courts.  It was argued that this should 
calm defence witness fears about appearing before a Rwandan judge.338    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Where the Prosecution argued that there were no adverse consequences upon the 
return of witnesses to Rwanda, the Defence claimed that attacks on defence witnesses 
have not been systematically monitored or tracked by Rwandan authorities or local 
organizations. Moreover, WVSS lacked follow-up mechanisms to address threats and 
harassment and therefore incidents were not recorded.  Further, defence witnesses 
feared that reporting would aggravate their security situation.339  In response to 
Rwanda’s claim that it had facilitated the work of foreign defence teams while on 
mission in Rwanda, the Defence argued that this cooperation did not show whether 
similar facilities and cooperation would be afforded to local counsel assigned to 
represent the Accused.340  Further, many witnesses who are refugees or asylum 
seekers would be afraid to return to unresolved issues that made them leave as well as 
losing their refugee status.341  Also, since the NPPA Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit 
will handle travel documentation and entry visas to Rwanda, this would also 
potentially discourage defence witnesses from abroad.342   
 
The Trial Chamber felt that it was not it’s role to determine whether the fears 
expressed by defence witnesses are legitimate, reasonable or well-founded, but simply 
“the likelihood that the Accused will be able to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him 
or her.”343  According to the Trial Chamber, the statement made by the Minister of 
Justice in 2007 about using signed affidavits from grants of immunity showing their 
current address to arrest defence witnesses, in combination with affidavits being 
provided by the NPPA’s Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit may give rise to the 
concerns of witnesses who fear being accused of genocide in connection to their 
testimony for the Defence.  However the Trial Chamber found overall that Article 13 
of the Transfer Law, granting witnesses immunity in regard to their testimony makes 
these fears “premature.”344  
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 The Trial Chamber reiterated that it was not its role to assess the fears of defence 
witnesses being transferred to prisons away from their families or persecuted in prison 
after testifying.345  Immunities and protections such as Article 14 and newly amended 
Article 13 should provide adequate protection.346  The Trial Chamber welcomed a 
commissioned study by the Minister of Justice examining the potential problems the 
law on the prohibition of genocide ideology.  However, the Chamber found 
unsatisfactory the unclear nature of how long this evaluation would take.  
Nevertheless, the Chamber requested Rwanda to inform the ICTR president of the 
progress of the studies before Uwinkindi’s trial begins in Rwanda and emphasised that 
if a witness or Accused made statements during the trial which denied genocide, it 
was expected that he or she shall not be prosecuted for contempt or perjury. 347  
 
The Trial Chamber subsequently turned to discuss fears of witnesses from within 
Rwanda.  Information that the number of defence witnesses was fewer than the 
number of prosecution witnesses was not considered to indicate lack of fair trial.  The 
Chamber took into account arguments that the low number of defence witnesses in a 
few cases could be a result of shaky self-representation.348  Further, the Trial Chamber 
decided Article 13 had addressed Defence witness fears of being accused of 
“genocide ideology”.349  Previous findings that witnesses may be unwilling to testify 
because of fears of serious consequences were balanced with the fact that in 36 
genocide cases tried in the High Court of Rwanda, the Defence in most cases was able 
to secure the attendance of witnesses without the safeguards of the transfer laws.350  
According to the Chamber, this was complemented by improvements made to the 
Rwandan Victims and Witness Support Unit and the Creation of the Witness 
Protection Unit under the Judiciary.351   
 
According to the Trial Chamber, findings that there would be inequalities in the 
weight of oral testimony since most Defence witnesses reside outside Rwanda and 
would have to testify via video-link testimony, have been reconciled by several  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alternative methods to give oral testimony.352  Moreover, the Accused could exercise 
his right to examine or cross-examine a witness353 by utilising video-link facilities.354 
Where witnesses claiming refugee status might face legal obstacles preventing them 
from returning to Rwanda, the Trial Chamber noted Rwanda’s several mutual 
assistance agreements with states in the region and elsewhere in Africa, as well as 
agreements, which have been arranged with other states.355   
 
The Trial Chamber then turned to an extensive discussion on Rwanda’s Witness 
protection program. The Prosecution submitted that Rwanda had addressed previous 
concerns that witnesses may be afraid to avail themselves of the services of Victim 
and Witness Support Unit (hereinafter the VWSU) because the Office of the 
Prosecutor General administers it.  In response, the Witness Protection Unit 
(hereinafter the WPU) was created. According to the Prosecutor, the Rwandan 
judiciary manages this service,356 with staff running both VWSU and WPU 
undertaking training programs conducted by the ICTR registry.357  The Defence 
argued that the witnesses do not wish their identities disclosed to any Rwandan 
authority.358  Moreover, the processes to access WPU had requirements such as the 
applicant requesting for the assistance of the Prosecutor General or Chief Prosecutor 
and this procedure is lengthy, bureaucratic and assistance can be denied.359  In 
support, HRW gave statistics that between 2006 and 2008, VWSU assisted 265 
defence witnesses and 739 prosecution witnesses, and argued that this discrepancy 
might reflect unwillingness by defence witnesses to use the service.360  The Trial 
Chamber was however satisfied with the steps Rwanda had taken to establish an 
additional witness protection unit.  It was aware that defence witnesses would have to 
apply to the Office of the Prosecutor general for assistance of WPU but noted that the 
judiciary would ultimately administer the protection service under WPU.361  Overall, 
the Chamber noted that external monitors would oversee these witness protection  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programmes as per Rule 11 bis (D)(ii).362  Therefore, an ICTR appointed monitor 
would be expected to meet with the defence counsel and WPU on a regular basis to 
address concerns through regular reports to the tribunal.363  Overall, the Chamber was 
satisfied with the improvement of the VWSU over the past two years, noting the 
increase in staff size, funding and awareness raising programmes.364 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Uwinkindi upheld the reasoning of the Trial Chamber.365  
Notably, the Appeals Chamber added that it would be a violation of the equality of 
arms if the majority of defence witnesses appeared by means substantially different 
from those of the prosecution.  However, Uwinkindi had not identified how many 
potential witnesses might fall into this category or that it constitutes a sufficiently 
significant part of his possible evidence.  Moreover, the Appeals Chamber found it 
cannot be said that hearing a portion of evidence from either party by alternative 
means would per se amount to the violation of an Accused’s rights.366  The 
subsequent cases upheld the reasoning in Uwinkindi.367  In its 19 August 2011 Report, 
Rwanda stated it was drafting legislation to provide clearer definitions to the 
Genocide Ideology laws.368   The government also reduced the applicable sentences as 
well as eliminated criminal responsibility for minors.369 
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However, in the later decision of Munyagashiri, the Defence raised the loophole that 
witnesses who testify in its transfer case may be compelled to provide evidence that is 
relevant to another non-transfer, domestic case.  Under Article 54 and 55 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, witnesses in Rwanda are obligated to appear and give 
evidence in other cases.370  Concerning is that when giving testimony in domestic 
proceedings, these witnesses would not be given the immunities provided for in the 
Transfer Law.  Coupled with laws criminalising genocide ideology, this loophole 
could be exploited by the Rwandan government.371  Although it was in the Trial 
Chamber’s view that this potential loophole may create objectively reasonable fears 
among defence witnesses, it noted that Rwanda did not intend to abolish the Genocide 
Ideology Law.  Therefore to eliminate the potential gap in immunity, the Trial 
Chamber made three suggestions the Prosecutor General could undertake.372  The 
Trial Chamber considered that any transfer had to be conditioned upon one of 
assurances.373   This loophole was discussed only once more in the subsequent case of 
Ryandikayo where the Trial Chamber simply said that it expects Rwanda “will 
continue with its efforts and requests that it submit another report on the ongoing 
reforms.”374  It is therefore uncertain whether the loophole has been reconciled.  
 
On 6 August 2012, the Prosecutor General provided the ICTR with an update on 
Rwanda’s ongoing legislative reforms, focusing on the proposed legislation to reform 
the genocide ideology law.  In later 2012, Rwanda’s Minister of Justice reported that 
the genocide ideology law would be replaced with “an entirely new law.”  The new 
law reduced the penalty from a maximum of 25 years to 9 years and the definition for  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“genocide ideology” was changed to be an “intentional act, done in public.”375  
According to HRW, the revised law has been submitted to the Rwandan parliament in 
2013.  However, HRW was also of the opinion that although the revised law 
contained a more narrow definition of the offence and a reduction in prison sentences, 
but it kept the notion of “genocide ideology” as a criminal offence.  Also, the 
unchanged vague language could still be used to criminalise free speech.376  This 
author agrees that the vague langue in the new law may still be used to convict 
defence witnesses.   
 
4.2 Evaluation 
Overall, the ICTR was of the opinion that amendments to the Transfer Law to provide 
immunities for defence witnesses as well as alternatives to video-link testimony 
would be enough to overcome the realities in Rwanda.  The decisions also saw an 
increase in the capacity of the Rwandan witness protection service, as well as a new 
witness protection unit being created to be run within the Supreme Court and High 
Court to calm witness fears of reporting to Rwandan police. Therefore the ICTR 
believed that this gave the Accused the guarantee to satisfactorily secure the 
attendance and examination of witnesses under the same conditions against him.  As a 
part of this evaluation, I will firstly turn to the Reports of the Monitor, which provide 
details on the progress and status of the witness protection programs.   
 
4.2.1 Reports of the Monitor 
Since the transfer of Uwinkindi and Munyagashari to Rwanda, the Reports of the 
monitor have made observations of the progress of the witness protection programs.  
In the “May to June 2012” report for Uwinkindi, the Accused highlighted the fact that 
of the 49 potential defence witnesses identified by his legal team, only eight resided in 
Rwanda.  However, the monitor noted that at the juncture of this case, the issue is not 
whether witnesses will travel to testify from abroad, but whether financial resources 
are available that would permit either the Defence or the Prosecution of investigations  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to conduct investigations abroad.  She noted that at the moment, there is no evidence 
that any such resources are available to either the Defence or the judicial police.377  
Moreover, she observed that the Prosecution and the judicial police were conducting 
defence investigations.  As a result, she determined that by giving judicial police or 
prosecution the information of defence witnesses, this could give the Prosecution the 
advantage of being able to obtain statements from its witnesses indicating what they 
were likely to say.  The monitor believed that this could ultimately become the central 
issue in determining whether his right to fair trial will be respected.378  However, the 
Rwandan court granted funding to the Defence to carry out investigations, which 
ultimately resolved this issue. (For an extensive discussion, see Chapter 6). 
 
According to Reports of the Monitor, progress in setting up witness programs was 
steady but without its challenges.  In the July 2012 report for the case of Uwinkindi, 
the Government of Rwanda asserted that the two witness programs under the Office 
of the Prosecutor General; the WVSU and the WPU which was ran under the auspices 
of the Supreme Court, were fully operational and functioning.379  However, when the 
monitor met with the Registrar of the Supreme Court, he was informed that an expert 
was expected to provide training to the registrars of the WPU in July 2012 but this 
project fell through.  The monitor was advised that the Registrar and his colleagues 
were waiting for the training session and the expert’s guidance to begin setting up the 
WPU.  Further, although financing was available to the Supreme Court for a safe 
house, no such safe house yet existed, and no staff apart from the registrars had yet 
been identified or hired.  In fact, no other preparations were in place.380  The monitor 
also met with the Coordinator of the WVSU, which was established in 2006 and 
reported that it appeared to be dynamic and fully functional.  With respect to the 
anonymity of witnesses, the Prosecution completed work on a draft law that would 
provide further protection.381  However, the monitor concluded that where the WPU 
had been reluctant to rent a safe house and hire staff, he observed that none of the 
Defence witnesses have yet been identified or contacted.  In the monitor’s opinion,   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it was not at all clear that an effective support and protection program could be set up 
within short deadlines that might arise in the Uwinkindi case.  This was particularly 
since genocide trials in Rwanda generally take no more than one or two months to 
compete.382  
 
By the end of 2012, the witness protection program had progressed and was arguably 
trial ready.  In the December report 2012 for Uwinkindi, the Chief Registrar of the 
Supreme Court informed the monitor that the Ministry of Justice was in the process of 
reorganising the old structure of the witness protection program.  Asked whether the 
program was ready and prepared to implement comprehensive witness protection 
should Court proceedings commence, he responded in the affirmative, and added that 
a safe house was already in place.383  At the end of July 2013, the monitor met with 
the head of the WPU384 who stated the budget was sufficient for the further 
modification and refurbishment of facilities within the Supreme Court to handle 
protected witnesses.  He informed the monitor that procurement procedures have been 
initiated for further improvement of facilities.385  Further, WPU had the means and 
infrastructure to access and support protected witnesses anywhere in Rwanda.  Also, a 
provision had been made in the WPU budget for a safe house where protected 
witnesses can be accommodated.  The WPU had additionally proposed creating a 
database of witnesses in order to provide protective measures even after the 
conclusion of trial.386  Moreover, the WPU had also assisted with the protection of 
witnesses in one genocide case before the High Court and Supreme Court.387  In the 
September 2013 report for the cases of Uwinkindi and Munyagishari, the head of 
WPU confirmed that it was ready to facilitate the travel of witnesses residing abroad 
and arrange for video-link testimony for those unwilling or unable to travel to 
Rwanda.388  In the November 2013 report for Uwinkindi and Munygishari, the head of 
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WPU provided a tour of the new courtroom facilities at the High Court, which had 
been designed to allow protected witnesses to testify.389   His office had also liaised 
with police in order to brief them and train them on the treatment of witnesses.390 
 
However, in the January 2014 report, the head of WPU stated the High Court had not 
yet requested the WPU to contact any protected witnesses in the Munyagashari and 
Uwinkindi case.391  He stated that in general, the parties litigating international crimes 
cases before the Court were not yet acclimated to the idea that the witnesses are under 
the care of the Court and protected as such.392   In general it was reported that the 
witness programmes have been resolved and are ready for operation.  However, as 
discussed earlier in the Decisions of the ICTR, the WPU was created so that witnesses 
would not need to avail themselves to the services of VWSU, which was administered 
by the Office of the Prosecutor General.  Certainly more work is needed for defence 
witnesses to utilise the WPU. 
 
Overall, although initial progress was shaky, the Reports of the monitor have 
indicated that these programmes are now fully operational.  However, it was not just 
the fear of harassment, violence and assassination that were of concern for defence 
witnesses in Rwanda but also that defence witness from abroad were concerned with 
being arrested under genocide denial laws that had been interpreted widely to arrest 
political opponents and defence lawyers.  It is concerning whether granting defence 
witnesses immunities from prosecution would alleviate fears since the Government of 
Rwanda, under the Rwandan Criminal Code could still decide to compel the witness 
                                                                                                                                                              
 <http://unmict.org/files/cases/munyagishari/other/en/131028_SeptReport.pdf> accessed 13 March 
2014 para 105. 
389 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi October-November 2013’, (MICT, 19 
December 2013) <http://unmict.org/files/cases/uwinkindi/other/en/131219.pdf> accessed 17 March 
2014 para 65; ICTR Monitor, ‘Monitoring Report for the Munyagishari Case (October and November 
2013)’ (MICT, 19 December 2013) <http://unmict.org/files/cases/munyagishari/other/en/131219.pdf> 
accessed 13 March 2014 para 36. 
390 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi October-November 2013’ (n 389) para 
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391 ICTR Monitor, ‘Monitoring Report for the Munyagishari Case (January and February 2014)’ 
(MICT, 7 March 2014) <http://unmict.org/files/cases/munyagishari/other/en/140307.pdf> accessed 13 
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2014’ (n 257) para 9. 
392 ICTR Monitor, ‘Monitoring Report for the Munyagishari Case (January and February 2014)’ (n 
391) para 21; ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi January-February 2014’ (n 
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to testify in a domestic case and then arrest them where the immunity would not 
apply.   
 
However, the Chamber made it clear that a transfer would be conditioned on an 
assurance from the Rwandan government that this would not be the case.  It is 
interesting that an assurance from the Rwandan government would suffice to alleviate 
the fears of defence witnesses coming from abroad.  The ICTR seemed to be resolved 
that it would not be able to convince Rwanda to abolish the Genocide Ideology law. It 
appears that the ICTR knew Rwanda was particularly adamant in keeping this law and 
felt that a government assurance would constitute the best protection if cases were to 
be transferred.  Overall, the law in Rwanda and witness protections programmes have 
been changed to provide immunities for witnesses. However, witnesses may still fear 
being arrested under “genocide ideology” laws through a loophole, which has not 
been reconciled.  It remains to be seen whether the witnesses will be protected under 
the assurances of the Rwandan government or deterred from testifying for a 
transferred accused by the possibility of being arrested. 
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5. Applicable Punishment 
 
According to Rule 11 bis, a Trial Chamber has to be satisfied that the death penalty 
will not be imposed or carried out.393  During the conception of the Completion 
Strategy the Prosecutor had already identified that “transfer is made difficult by the 
fact that Rwandan law prescribes death penalty as a sentence for certain crimes.”394  
In 2007, Rwanda abolished the death penalty, which had previously been a penalty for 
those who were convicted of serious crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.395  The Trial Chamber in Munyakazi was satisfied that the new Repealed 
Death Penalty Law396 meant that “the death penalty provisions in the Rwandan Code 
of Criminal Procedure or any other legislation are no longer applicable” and therefore 
the Chamber was content that the death penalty would not be imposed in Rwanda.397   
In it’s place, the death penalty was substituted by life imprisonment or life 
imprisonment with special provisions.398  Life imprisonment with special conditions 
under the 2007 Organic law would mean that a convicted person is kept in isolation 
and was reserved for re-offenders and those who have committed “atrocious crimes.”    
The abolishment of the death penalty by the government of Rwanda showed its 
willingness to cooperate with the ICTR to establish a fair penalty in-line with 
international standards. 
 
Although there is no provision in Rule 11 bis that a Trial Chamber may set out the 
conditions of detention for a convicted accused, the Trial Chamber in Munyakazi399 
reasoned that according to the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, the penalty 
structure within a State to which an indictment may be referred must provide an 
appropriate punishment for offences with which the Accused is currently charged.”400                                                          
393  RPE (n 10) Rule 11 bis para c. 
394 Letter dated 3 October 2003 from the permanent representative of Rwanda to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (n 95) para 23 
395 Organic Law No 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 (n 142) art 2.  
396 ibid preamble. 
397 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 29) para 24. 
398 Organic Law No 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 (n 142) states “In all legislative texts in force before the 
commencement of this Law, the death penalty is substituted by life imprisonment or life imprisonment 
with special provision provided for by this Organic Law.”  
399Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 29) para 21. 
400 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Munyakazi (n 29) referred to cases such as Prosecutor v 
Radovan Stankovic (Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11 bis) IT-96-32/2-PT (17 May 2005) 
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Further, the ICTR would take into account that conditions of detention must be in 
accordance with internationally recognised standards.401  The Trial Chamber reasoned 
that the conditions of detention in a national jurisdiction, “touches upon”402 the 
fairness of that jurisdiction which is “an inquiry squarely within the Chamber’s 
mandate.”403  With this reasoning, the Trial Chamber has arguably stepped outside the 
plain wording of Rule 11 bis that states that the death penalty will not to be imposed 
or carried out.404 
 
However, imprisonment in isolation has been a particular concern for Rwanda.  In 
2009, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) recommended that Rwanda “should put 
an end to the sentence of solitary confinement and ensure that persons sentenced to 
life imprisonment benefit from the safeguards of United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”405  The Committee noted that although it 
welcomed the abolition of the death penalty in 2007, it was concerned that it had been 
replaced at present by life imprisonment in solitary confinement.  The Committee 
noted solitary confinement is treatment contrary to Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.406  Particularly, these minimum rules hold that “the efforts 
addressed to the abolition of solitary confinement as a punishment, or the restriction 
of its use should be undertaken and encouraged.”407 The HRC stressed that it 
“remains concerned about deplorable conditions in some prisons, particularly as 
regards to health conditions, access to health care and food”408 and urged Rwanda to 
“adopt effective measures against overcrowding in detention centres and ensure 
conditions of detention that respect the dignity of prisoners, in accordance with 
Article 10 of the Covenant.”409 
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 5.1 The decisions of the ICTR on life imprisonment in isolation 
The concern that Rwanda would not provide an appropriate punishment to the 
Accused was firstly discussed in the transfer decision of Munyakazi,410 which denied 
the transfer of the case to Rwanda.  The Trial Chamber felt that the Accused could be 
subjected to life imprisonment in isolation,411 since the Repealed Death Penalty Law, 
which abolished the death penalty stated that the penalty would be replaced as 
such.412  The Prosecution stated according to the Transfer Law, “life imprisonment 
shall be the heaviest penalty imposed upon a convicted person in a case transferred to 
Rwanda from the ICTR.”413  The tension lay as to which law would be applicable, the 
earlier Transfer Law or the later Repealed Death Penalty Law.  The Trial Chamber 
decided that since there was no inconsistency between the two laws, the later 
Repealed Death Penalty law would override the former Transfer law and the Accused 
could face life imprisonment in isolation.414   Moreover, The Trial Chamber was of 
the opinion based on “established jurisprudence and observations of Human Rights 
bodies” that “imprisonment in isolation should be an exceptional punishment” applied 
only where necessary, proportionate and in compliance with minimum safeguards.415  
For the penalty to be adequate, the court considered the minimum safeguards of an 
assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the punishment, right to review by 
a judicial body and arrangements of activities to ensure human contact and mental 
physical stimulation in the Rwandan Law.416   
 
In the subsequent decision of Kanyarukiga,417 the Trial Chamber agreed that the 
Accused risked solitary confinement due to the tension between the Death Penalty 
law and the Transfer law.  Since there was no case law in Rwandan courts concerning 
the relationship between the Repealed Death Penalty Law and the Transfer law, it was 
unclear which law would apply.418  The Prosecution argued the Transfer law could be                                                         
410 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 29) para 39. 
411 ibid paras 29-32. 
412 ibid para19. 
413 ibid art 21. 
414 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 29) para 28. 
415 ibid para 30. 
416 ibid paras 31-32. 
417 Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda (n 115). 
418 ibid para 96. 
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interpreted as lex specialis in the field of transfer and therefore would apply.  
However, the legal situation was deemed by the Chamber to be unclear. This was 
particularly so where the Death Penalty law could also be interpreted as lex posterior 
as it was adopted a few months after and stated in Article 9 that “all legal provisions 
contrary to this Organic Law are hereby repealed.”  This according to the Trial 
Chamber made the application uncertain and the Accused Kanyarukiga was not 
considered satisfactorily protected against a conviction of imprisonment isolation if 
transferred.419  In the following case, the Trial Chamber in Hategkimana agreed that, 
the Chamber could not rule out that a Rwandan Court could possibly apply the Death 
Penalty and the Accused could face imprisonment in isolation.420  The Trial Chamber 
agreed with the decision of Munyakazi421 that the Death Penalty Abolition law does 
not seem to provide any safeguards under Rwandan law to ensure that the use of 
solitary confinement for 20 years, or more would not be abused.422  
 
The Appeals Chamber in Munyakazi423 agreed with the Trial Chamber that it was 
unclear how these two laws may be interpreted and which law would prevail where 
there is an inconsistency.424  In the Amicus Brief submitted by Rwanda, on the scope 
of the law, the report assured that no person transferred by the ICTR would be 
sentenced to life imprisonment in solitary confinement, and the Supreme Court of 
Rwanda was seized of a constitutional challenge to provisions regarding solitary 
confinement.425  However, the Appeals Chamber in Kanyarukiga decided there was 
no reason to depart from the findings of the Appeals Chamber in Munyakazi,426 
although the Rwandan government stated that they had submitted a formal request to 
the Parliament for the authentic interpretation of sentencing provisions of the Transfer 
law.427   In contrast, Kanyarukiga submitted that in a recent Supreme Court case and a  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letter from the Minister of Internal Security indicated that Rwanda has no intention of 
abolishing solitary confinement as a penalty.428  The Defence in Munyakazi also 
responded that the fact that Rwanda found it necessary to issue a statement is proof 
that the law is ambiguous.429  The ICTR was adamant that the courts of Rwanda 
provided an interpretation of the relevant laws.430 
 
Similar reasoning appeared in the Trial Chamber of Gatete431 and Hategekimana432 
which both did not allow for the transfer of the Accused. In the case of 
Hategekimana, the Rwandan government submitted that the parliament recently 
passed a new law that modified the Repealed Death Penalty Law.433  In this new law, 
life imprisonment with special provisions was verified not to apply to cases 
transferred to Rwanda.434 Hategekimana responded that Rwanda could modify this 
law again once he was transferred since this law was enacted so quickly, 
demonstrating the instability of Rwanda’s legislative system.435  However, the 
Appeals Chamber acknowledged that if the new law had entered into force in its 
current form, ambiguity as to applicable punishment would be resolved.436  By 
changing the transfer law, the government of Rwanda had satisfied that life 
imprisonment in solitary confinement would not be a penalty. 
 
In the case of Uwinkindi,437 the Trial Chamber decided based on rather sparse 
reasoning that the Accused would not be at risk of a penalty of life imprisonment in 
solitary confinement.  Since both the Prosecution and the Defence no longer disputed  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that life imprisonment with special conditions could be a potential penalty in transfer 
cases,438 the Chamber found the current penalty structure of Rwanda to be adequate. 
Overall, the Chamber was satisfied by the ambiguity of whether the Repealed Death 
Penalty Law or Transfer Law that existed in previous Rule 11 bis applications were 
no longer present.439  The former Chief of the Appeals and Legal Advisory Division 
of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR, Alex Odora argued that the position taken 
by the Appeals Chamber was not duly justified.  He wrote that this decision “did not 
have substantive persuasive reasons explaining its departure… although it has the 
right to do so” given that “it is a settled legal principle that an Appeals Chamber need 
not give reasons on every issue it decides.”440  After the Trial Chamber decision in 
Uwinkindi, the Defence or ICDAA no longer contested whether the Accused could be 
held in life imprisonment in isolation in the Appeal of Uwinkindi,441 or in any other 
subsequent decision.442  
  
5.2 Evaluation 
From the initial decision of Munyakazi, the ICTR was not convinced as to whether the 
Repealed Death Penalty Law would be applied, and therefore the Accused may risk 
imprisonment in isolation.    The Chamber decided that since there were no examples 
of case law in Rwandan courts concerning the relationship between the two laws 
being applied the situation was unclear.  In the case of Uwinkindi, the Chamber was 
satisfied by new provisions of the Repealed Death Penalty Law explicitly stating that 
life imprisonment with special provisions would not apply to the cases transferred 
from the ICTR to Rwanda.  The ICTR believed that the Rwandan law verified that  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life imprisonment in isolation would not be employed as a penalty for the transfer 
cases.  However, the Chamber did not check whether life imprisonment in isolation 
occurred in Rwandan prisons.  One reason for this could be that in the previous 
jurisprudence of the tribunal, it was held that the ICTR was not required to look 
further than the State’s relevant legislation when determining whether an accused 
would receive a fair trial in that State.443  The Trial Chamber in the transfer cases 
acknowledged however, “that it is not required to look beyond the relevant 
legislation, but considers that it is authorized to do so.”444   Therefore, the Chamber 
considered that it may and should look beyond relevant legislation to examples of the 
practices of Rwandan courts.445  Another reason could be that Rule 11 bis makes no 
explicit mention of conditions of detention.446  However, the Trial Chamber reasoned 
that the conditions of detention in a national jurisdiction touch on the fairness of that 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, the Chamber reiterated that it “has to be satisfied the accused 
will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned”.447    
 
5.2.1 Reports of the Monitor 
The abolishment of the death penalty is certainly a positive step forward for the 
Rwandan penalties to be in-line with international standards. Moreover, the Reports 
of the Monitor have shown that it is highly unlikely the transferred Accused will face 
life imprisonment in isolation.  In a series of meetings with the Accused, the Monitor 
discussed his feedback in regards of the conditions of detention and his perspectives 
on the progress of his trial.  In the December 2013 Report of the monitor, 
Munyagashiri complained that the Special Enclosure detainees were not allowed to 
attend religious services with prisoners in the main section of Kigali Central Prison, 
where there is a church.  Munyagishari said that this was a way of isolating the 
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Special Enclosure detainees.448  Similarly, in the February 2014 Report of the monitor 
for the case of Uwinkindi, the Accused described the condition of the Special 
Enclosure for transferred detainees as isolated since they do not interact with general 
prison population.449  The monitor did not assess the complaints of the Accuseds.  
This reflects the decision of the President of the Mechanism in November 2013450   
which considered that monitors should “limit themselves to providing objective 
information relevant to any possible violations or impediments to the fair trial rights” 
and should refrain from including in their reports any opinion, assessment, or 
conclusions.”451  In the author’s opinion, these complaints were the closest relating to 
imprisonment in isolation and are clearly not within the meaning.  Under the scrutiny 
of the monitor, life imprisonment in isolation is a penalty that is unlikely to happen 
for the two accused. 
 
However, in the new law, which modified the Repealed Death Penalty Law, life 
imprisonment in isolation still applies to Rwandan cases, which are not transferred by 
the ICTR.  So far, only eight cases have been referred to Rwanda; with only two 
Accuseds in pre-trial detention and the remaining six still fugitives.452 Life 
imprisonment in isolation will still be a punishment overall for local cases.  This is 
particularly true since the ICTR not check the practice of imprisonment in isolation in 
Rwandan jails.   Further, this could also result in a rather contradictory penalty, where 
higher-level organizers of the genocide are transferred to Rwanda where they would 
face a lesser penalty than other participants with less culpability that have not had 
their cases transferred by the ICTR and have been tried nationally. 
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6.  Right to an Effective Defence 
 
The issues that I have discussed thus far are concerns, which have appeared during the 
decisions as to whether to transfer the cases to Rwanda.  However, one issue that has 
appeared after the transfer has been the problem of the right to an effective defence.  
Since the Appeals decision of Uwinkindi has confirmed the referral of the case to 
Rwanda, the Office of the Prosecutor has appointed a monitor, which has been 
reporting to the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals.453  On the 3rd of 
May 2013, the Appeals Chamber also upheld the referral of the case of 
Munyagishari454 to Rwanda for trial where the Prosecutor also appointed a monitor to 
observe the proceedings.455  One of the main concerns as reported by the monitor, has 
been the payment of Defence Counsel and the lack of staff being assigned to each 
case.  On the 16th of September 2013, the Counsel for Uwinkindi filed a request for 
revocation of the order referring Uwinkindi’s case to Rwanda on the basis that the 
Ministry of Justice of Rwanda had not made the necessary funds available to 
Uwinkindi’s defence team that would allow it to contact defence witnesses, the 
defence team has insufficient members, and Counsel for Uwinkindi have not been 
paid since February 2013.456   
 
On the 14th March 2014 the President of the Mechanism decided on the matter.  He 
considered that “insofar as the funding issues raised by Counsel for Uwinkindi could 
impact, inter alia, the adequacy of time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence or his ability to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, these are matters of 
concern to the Mechanism.457   However, the President found that various funding 
issues raised by the Revocation Request had either been rendered moot or are still the 
focus of ongoing negotiations that may be subject to further review within the  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Rwandan courts.458  The President dismissed the revocation request, however, invited 
the Defence to file a new request for revocation should circumstances so warrant.459  
Rather than revoke the case the President believed that this should be a matter to be 
reconciled by the Rwandan Courts.  However, of concern is that the decisions of the 
ICTR on to transfer the case to Rwanda overlooked funding of defence as an issue.  
Below, I will give an overview of these decisions to determine how the issues were 
decided.  I will then turn to the Reports of the Monitor to evaluate whether these 
funding issues can be resolved and their impact on future transfer cases. 
 
6.1 The decisions of the ICTR on legal aid 
At the ICTR, under Article 20(4)(d) if the accused did not have sufficient means to 
pay for counsel, legal assistance will be assigned to him or her.460 However, once the 
accused’s case has been transferred, Article 13(6) of the Transfer Law applies which 
provides that in case the accused “has no means to pay, he or she shall be entitled to 
legal representation.”461  The Transfer Law also holds that an accused shall be given 
adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence.462  This provision reflects the 
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR where the accused has the right to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it...” 
[emphasis added]463 and Article 14(3)(b) where in the determination of any criminal 
charges against him, everyone shall be entitled to the minimum guarantee of 
“adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate 
with defence counsel of his own choosing” [emphasis added].464   
 
In an early decision not to transfer the case of Kanyarukiga to Rwanda, in regards to 
funding for Defence, the Chamber noted the submissions of two amici that Rwandan 
authorities had not disbursed funds to provide payment for legal representation of 
indigent accused in the past, and that the legal aid budget administered by the 
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Rwandan Bar Association was always depleted.465  However, according to the 
Chamber, what mattered in that context, was the situation under the Transfer Law 
where the Ministry of Justice had made budgetary provisions of approximately 
500,000 USD for 2008 to fund the legal aid scheme in respect to the transfer cases.  
The Chamber decided that it did not have to consider whether this amount will be 
sufficient, and that it follows from case law that there is no obligation to establish in 
detail the sufficiency of funds available as a precondition for referral, such as 
itemising the provisions of the budget.466  The Chamber was therefore satisfied that 
legal aid would be available if Kanyarukiga is transferred and if there were future 
financial constraints, it would be a matter for the monitor mechanism to evaluate.467  
In the subsequent case of Hategekimana, the Trial Chamber clarified Avocats Sans 
Frontiers in cooperation with the Belgian Technical School would also provide funds 
for Defence Counsel.468  The subsequent decision in the case of Gatete adopted the 
same reasoning.469 
 
In Kayishema, the ICCDA noted that Rwanda had passed laws that create the right to 
counsel for indignent persons accused of genocide.  It pointed to the fact that money 
for legal aid is not allocated to a case, but goes to pay the salaries of staff who handle 
all legal aid requests and cases for both civil and criminal matters, for the entire 
country.470  The Chamber trusted that the Prosecution and Rwanda had provided 
sufficient budgetary allocations for legal aid to the Accused in good faith and that the 
Chamber would “not lightly intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of Rwanda, and 
considers that it is not obligated to either scrutinise Rwanda’s budget or verify its 
disbursal.”471  The Chamber warned of the possibility of revocation of the Accused’s 
referral should they need to address any failure by the Rwandan authorities to make 
counsel available or disburse funds necessary for legal aid and to ensure the 
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Accused’s fair trial rights.472  The issue of Defence funding was not brought up in the 
Appeal of Munyakazi, Kanyarukiga and Hategekimana.473 
 
In the transfer decision of Uwinkindi, the Prosecution and Rwanda submitted that 
Rwanda has created several legal programmes and has made a budgetary provision of 
100 million Rwandan francs to fund legal aid for transferred cases.474   On the other 
hand, HRW submitted that the Rwandan legal system might still be limited in its 
ability to provide the Accused with counsel or financial support for representation.475  
In the Trial Chamber’s decision to transfer the case, the Chamber reiterated that it did 
not share the Defence’s position that it should verify the availability of funds for legal 
aid at the domestic level and would not lightly intervene in the domestic jurisdiction 
of Rwanda.476  This issue was not brought up for review upon Appeal of the 
decision.477 
 
However, in the Transfer decision of the following case of Munyagashiri, the Defence 
submitted that the Rwandan legal aid system was insufficiently funded and that the 
funds earmarked for legal aid were unknown.  According to the Defence, the extra 30 
million Rwandan francs added to the 2010-2011 budgets could not be considered 
legal aid funds since they are designated for general ICTR related costs.  Moreover, 
the funds allocated to the KBA by the Ministry of Justice could not be used for 
transferees because it had been expressly placed aside for vulnerable people.  Finally, 
the Defence considered that 92 million Rwandan francs available for all referred cases 
were not considered sufficient.478  The Chamber did not agree, recalling that it was 
not obligated to itemise the provisions of Rwanda’s budget and “the factual assertions 
of the Defence fail to rebut the affidavits of the Minister of Justice and the Secretary-
                                                        
472 ibid para 106. 
473 Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi, Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal against Decision on Referral 
under Rule 11 bis (n 184); Prosecutor v Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Appeal 
against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 bis (n 196); Prosecutor v Idelphonse Hategekimana, 
Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal for Request under Rule 11 bis (n 197). 
474 Prosecutor v Jean Uwinkindi, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda (n 20) para 141. 
475 ibid. 
476 ibid para 144. 
477 Jean Uwinkindi v The Prosecutor, Decision on Uwinkindi's Appeal against the Referral of his case 
to Rwanda and Related Motions (n 20).  
478 Prosecutor v Bernard Munyagishari, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case 
to the Republic of Rwanda (n 206) para 151. 
  72 
General of the Supreme Court.”479  The Chamber considered these assurances that 
appropriate funding would be provided in good faith.  Moreover, it was encouraged 
by the Prosecution’s submission that 118 million Rwandan francs had been 
designated specifically for transferred cases for the period between January and June 
2012 in reaction to the referral of Uwinkindi.480 
 
6.2 Reports of the monitor 
To analyse the progression of the issue of adequate funding for Defence Counsel in 
each case after transfer, I will firstly discuss the reports of the monitor for the case of 
Uwinkindi and then turn to the reports of the monitor for the case of Munyagishari.  
From the first report of the monitor, the Counsel for Uwinkindi had not been paid for 
his work.481  The argument of the monitor reiterated the concerns of Uwinkindi’s 
Defence Counsel in the decision to transfer the case to Rwanda.  According to the 
monitor the Rwandan legal system might still be limited in its ability to provide the 
Accused with counsel or financial support for representation.482 Also, the KBA has no 
budget of its own to provide for the defence of indigent accused persons.  Therefore, 
any fund it receives comes from the Ministry of Justice.  However, in the monitor’s 
opinion no designated fund for legal aid has ever existed at the Ministry of Justice.483  
The monitor explained, the actual figure that the Rwandan government has, in theory, 
set to provide for Uwinkindi’s legal assistance is completely unknown.  She argued 
“more importantly, whether the figure is 10 Rwandan francs or 122 million Rwandan 
francs, two months after Uwinkindi’s transfer to Rwanda, none of this money has 
reached the Defence and no commitment to provide any funds in the future has been 
made.”484  According to the monitor rather than addressing the substance of 
Uwinkindi’s case, the Defence has been devoted to addressing the issue of funding.485 
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In the September 2012 report of the monitor, in a meeting with the monitor, the 
Defence Lead Counsel highlighted that his team was facing constraints on account of 
unavailability of funding to conduct Defence investigations.  He stated that legal aid 
provided to him and his co-counsel only pertained to remuneration for provision of 
services.  The legal aid budget did not permit hiring investigative personnel or to 
incur any travel or other expenses to allow the Defence to identify potential Defence 
witnesses, make contact with them or take their preliminary statements to ensure their 
availability before court.486  He also acknowledged that on 18 July 2012, the Ministry 
of Justice concluded the work done by the Defence was as of now paid and a contract 
was negotiated for legal aid.487  However, the Defence Lead Counsel reiterated that 
his team was still facing constraints on account of unavailability of funding to conduct 
Defence investigations.488 The Defence also complained that the 30,000 Rwandan 
francs he had negotiated was the minimum rate for legal aid in an ordinary case 
before a Rwandan court and was not an appropriate sum for a complex case.  
Moreover, there was still no provision for administrative expenses.489  On 17 January 
2013, in a private meeting with the monitor, the Lead Counsel for Uwinkindi, raised 
the concern to strengthen the Defence team who is only composed of two lawyers. 
Also, the request for the appointment of Defence investigators to assist the team in 
locating and interviewing defence witnesses and a Legal Assistant was still 
unaddressed.490   
 
By March 2013, in the scheduled commencement of trial, the High Court of Rwanda 
observed that it was almost one year since the case of Uwinkindi was transferred to 
Rwanda for trial.  It commented that the trial had already been postponed several 
times on the request of the Defence, and that the Defence did not seem to be prepared 
for the trial.491  The Defence submitted that one of the obstacles to the commencement 
of trial was the appointment of independent Defence Investigators.492  On the 16th  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May 2013, the Court denied the Defence request for the appointment of Investigators 
and Legal Assistants, noting that Law Number 11/2007 (the Transfer law)493 does not 
provide for such an appointment.  Moreover, in regards to the appointment of 
Investigators, the Court noted that relevant paragraphs of Law Number 13/2004494 
related to Criminal Procedures provides that the Judicial Police should conduct 
investigations on behalf of the Defence as well.  The Court ordered that the Defence 
approach the Rwandan Ministry of Justice and Kigali Bar Association for allocation 
of financial resources to facilitate investigations by the Defence Counsel 
themselves.495  On 11 October 2013, before the High Court of Rwanda, the Defence 
argued that despite the previous decisions of the High Court of Rwanda where the 
court permitted the Defence to contact the Ministry of Justice to seek funds to conduct 
its investigation, no money had been received to conduct the investigation as of the 
date of the hearing.  Also, the Defence had not received money to contact witnesses 
within Rwanda or witnesses living abroad.496  The Prosecutor replied that the Defence 
had lied about not receiving money for its investigation, as the Prosecution had 
received a copy of the cheque that had been issued by the Ministry of Justice to the 
National Bank on 27 September 2013.497  The Defence replied that it had not received 
the money as of 10 October 2013.498  The Court deliberated and decided that the 
Defence had received the money from the Ministry of Justice for investigations.499   
 
On 11 October 2013, the Defence complained that he had not been paid since 
February 2013 and he had submitted invoices for payment of work performed in 
February, March and April 2013.500   On 18 November 2013, the Defence indicated 
that he received a letter from the Ministry of Justice indicating that the payment 
scheme for the case was being changed and that the previous contract he was working 
under was void.501  In a meeting with the Permanent Secretary in the Rwandan 
Ministry of Justice, the new proposed payment policy would institute a lump sum  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payment system, providing a single amount for the case.502  This is similar to the 
ICTR policy whereby the Registrar may establish an alternative scheme of payment 
based on a fixed fee system consisting of a maximum allotment of money for each 
Defence Team in respect of each stage of the procedure.503  This system provides 
defence teams with greater flexibility and incentive to manage their resources in the 
most efficient manner.504  On 13 January 2014, according to the Permanent Secretary 
of the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, the Defence had come to an agreement with the 
Ministry of Justice regarding remuneration.505  However, the Defence argued 
although they had signed the contract, the monthly amount provided for in the 
contract did not properly reflect the amount of work required for a case of that 
magnitude and size.506  The monitor noted by the end of November, negotiations 
continue between the Defence Counsel and Ministry of Justice on providing funding 
for the Defence.507 
 
Uwinkindi is not the only transferred case, which has had issues with funding of 
Defence Counsel.  At a 7 November 2013 meeting between the monitor and Defence 
Counsel for Munyagishari, the Lead Counsel indicated that he had not received a 
proposed contract for the case.508  He stated that himself and his Co-Counsel were 
currently working without a contract and they had yet to be paid for their 
representation of Munyagishari.509  On the 22nd of November 2013, the Monitor met 
with the President of the Rwanda Bar Association who stated that he met with 
Ministry of Justice and they agreed that the Ministry would negotiate payment for 
transferred cases directly with counsel.510  Three months later, the Monitor met with 
the Permanent Secretary in the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, who noted the contract                                                         
502 ibid para 43. 
503 ICTR, ‘Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel’ (ICTR, 14 March 2008) 
<http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Directive%20on%20Assignment/English/05-
Directive%20Assignment.pdf> accessed 20 March 2014 art 22 (c) 
504UNSC, ‘Comprehensive Report on the Progress made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in Reforming its Legal Aid System’ (12 August 2003) General UN Doc A/58/288 
24 as cited by Silvia de Bertodano, ‘What Price Defence? Resourcing the Defence at the ICTY’ (2004) 
2 JICJ 503 507.  
505 ICTR Monitor, ‘Report of the Court Monitor for Uwinkindi (January-February 2014)’ (n 257) para 
27. 
506 ibid para 31. 
507 ibid, para 70. 
508 ICTR Monitor, ‘Monitoring Report for the Munyagishari Case (October and November 2013)’ (n 
390) para 38. 
509 ibid para 40. 
510 ibid para 41. 
  76 
provided to Counsel representing Jean Uwinkindi, which provided funding of one 
million Rwandan francs per counsel per month for the duration of the Uwinkindi 
proceedings.   For Munyagishari, the renumeration for defence would be a lump sum 
payment of 15 million Rwandan francs for the entire duration of the case.  The same 
lump sum will be given to other transfer cases.511  He also stated that the Ministry of 
Justice had not been informed of who is the counsel for Munyagishari and therefore 
non-contract negotiations had begun with regard to the payment of the Defence in that 
case.512 
 
On the 29th of January 2014, the Rwandan Bar Association said that it would provide 
advice to assigned counsel and the Ministry of Justice regarding the reasonableness of 
fees to be paid.513  Two days later, the monitor met with the Co-Counsel for 
Munyagishari.  He stated that the Defence had received a letter from the President of 
the Rwandan Bar Association informing the Defence to go to the Ministry of Justice 
and negotiate a contract setting out the terms of their representation.  He stated that 
the Defence team for Munyagishari had not yet received any payment.514  As of 26 
February 2014, in the latest report of the Monitor, the Defence was unable to secure a 
meeting with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice regarding a potential 
contract providing for re-numeration as the Permanent Secretary was on mission.515 
 
6.3 Evaluation 
The reports of the monitor for the transfer cases have shown to the contrary of 
decisions from the ICTR where the Chamber was confident that legal aid would be 
available if the cases were transferred.   During the decisions of the transfer case, 
Trial Chamber was encouraged by the Prosecution’s submission that 118 million 
Rwandan francs had been designated specifically for transferred cases for the period 
between January 2012 and June 2012 in reaction to the Referral of Uwinkindi.  The 
Chamber was also satisfied that Advocats Sans Frontiers would also provide funding 
in cooperation with the Belgian Technical School  
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However, in reality, the Monitor in two transferred cases, have indicated that Counsel 
for both Uwinkindi and Munyagashiri have had problems with payment.  In the case 
of Uwinkindi, the Defence has complained that legal aid provided did not permit for 
hiring Defence investigative personnel and legal assistants.  The Defence also argued 
that there was no provision for administrative expenses and the overall amount was 
not an appropriate sum for a complex case.  However, of most concern is that the 
Defence had postponed the trial several times and did not seem prepared.  
Particularly, where the Defence has submitted that one of the obstacles to the 
commencement of trial was the appointment of independent Defence investigators.  In 
the end, the Court ordered the Defence to approach the Rwandan Ministry of Justice 
and the KBA for allocation of financial resources to facilitate the investigations 
themselves.   It seems as though the situation has eventually resolved itself over time.  
This is similar to the occasion where the Defence complained he had not been paid for 
three months and was paid after the Ministry of Justice finalised a new payment 
policy.  However, in the case of Munyagishari, the Defence Counsel indicated that he 
had not received a proposed contract for the case.  As of 26 February 2014, almost 
one and a half years after the Decision to transfer the case on the 6 June 2012, 
payment still had not been made.  Alike the previous situations, given time, it is likely 
a proposed contract can be agreed upon and payment will be made. 
 
It is concerning that waiting for funding could result in inadequacy of facilities for the 
preparation of the Accused’s defence.  The ICTR has taken a non-interference 
approach on the matter of payment of Defence Counsel.  This reflects the challenge of 
deciding how much involvement an international tribunal should have after the 
transfer of the case.  Particularly on the issue of funding, micro-managing Rwanda’s 
budget could appear condescending and discouraging.  In this situation, this author 
believes that at this stage, the ICTR made the correct decision not to intervene unless 
there unless problems with negotiations became serious and there was a grave threat 
to the effectiveness of the Defence. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
From the conception of idea to transfer cases to national courts in 2000516 till the 
Appeal decision to transfer the first case to Rwanda at the end of 2011,517 the transfer 
of cases back to Rwanda has been a decade long process.  Through an analysis of the 
history of the transfer cases, the ICTR transfer decisions and the Reports of the 
Monitor, this thesis set out to determine the main challenges of the transfer cases and 
whether these challenges were adequately resolved before transfer.  Despite political 
will in Rwanda to accommodate the transfer cases, during the writing process of this 
thesis it has become evident that there have been two prominent challenges that have 
precluded transfer.   The first concern is the capacity of the Rwandan legal system to 
prosecute large and complex cases. The second is the issue of the neutrality of the 
territory, particularly whether there is the judicial independence to prosecute leaders 
of the previous regime fairly.   
 
Overall, the capacity of the Rwandan legal system to prosecute the transfer cases has 
been largely resolved.   To prepare for the transfer of cases, the ICTR has increased 
it’s capacity and out-reach activities to strengthen Rwanda’s capacity to prosecute 
cases.   From video-link projects, to a Special Enclosure for the transfer detainees, and 
the creation of programs and units to protect witnesses, the ICTR has worked hard to 
facilitate the transfer of cases to Rwanda.  The creation of the Witness Protection Unit 
under the auspices of the Rwandan courts, for witnesses afraid to avail themselves to 
the police, and the Victim and Witness Support Unit are now fully operational.  As a 
suggestion, for the future of the witness protection program, a more effective outreach 
program could ensure the WPU is more utilised.  Moreoever, the organisation of the 
lump sum payment system implemented in Uwinkindi is a step forward in the 
payment of the Defence. Given the slow organisation of payment in the past, this 
author is confident that the Defence Counsel for Munyagashiri will also be paid in 
time.  Finally not only has the Death penalty in Rwanda been abolished, life 
imprisonment in isolation will not be a penalty for the transfer cases.  Therefore, it is 
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in this author’s opinion that the Rwandan legal system has the capacity to prosecute 
the Transfer cases. 
 
Secondly, the issue of neutrality has also been largely resolved.  With a history of 
government interferences prosecuting former RPF members, the criminalisation of 
genocide ideology and the wide interpretation of the law to convict political 
opponents has been the major concern for the transfer cases.  Not only was there the 
risk that judges may not make a decision independent from the government, but 
witnesses may also fear testifying.  This author agrees with the ICTR Chambers that 
many of the examples where one may question the impartiality of the judiciary are 
rather old.  It was in 2008 that the Military Court acquitted two RPF soldiers and the 
Rwandan Government had released a series of strongly critical statements against the 
tribunal.  Moreover, it was more than a decade ago, in 2002 that Rwanda suspended 
cooperation with the ICTR, after a decision favoring an Accused’s motion.  Further, 
this author is not aware of examples after the 2012 conviction of Victoria Ingabire in 
the Rwandan Supreme Court or the 2010 arrest of Ingabire’s Defence lawyer for 
“genocide denial.”  Although it may be too early in trial proceedings to tell, the 
reports of the Monitor have shown that there has not been any indication against the 
impartiality of hearings.  Moreover, for witnesses the fear of intimidation, threats and 
arrests for harbouring “genocide ideology” are now protected by the Transfer laws, 
which have been changed to provide immunity from arrest.   One concern is that 
witnesses may still fear being arrested under “genocide ideology” laws through a 
loophole, which has not been reconciled.  However, it remains to be seen whether the 
witnesses will find comfort in the assurances of the Rwandan government rather than 
deterred from testifying for a transferred accused by the possibility of being arrested.  
This author concludes that presently, the Rwanda is a neutral territory to hold the 
trials of the transfer cases. 
 
Although this author believes that the Accuseds would be afforded a fair trial and 
penalty in line with international standards if the cases were transferred to Rwanda, it 
should be highlighted that it is unlikely capacity changes will affect the Rwandan 
legal system overall.  Notably, only 8 cases have been referred to Rwanda, with two 
Accuseds currently in detention and 6 still fugitives.  One criticism is that Rwandans, 
which have not been indicted by the ICTR, particularly the thousands of cases before 
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the Gacaca courts, may not benefit from judicial and witness protection training.  
They will not enjoy the special enclosure for transfer detainees or an international 
tribunal championing their access to legal aid funding.  Further, they may still be 
sentenced to life imprisonment in isolation or convicted of harbouring “genocide 
ideology” under a law, which has been widely interpreted.  It is unlikely that 
Rwandans overall will have an external monitor scrutinising the fair trial standards of 
their case.  
 
With the completion of the mandate of the Ad-Hoc tribunals, the lessons of the 
transfer cases should not be abandoned.  The changes to the Rwandan justice system 
and fair penalties have resulted from capacity building in areas such as witness 
protection programs, judicial training, building new prisons and the enactment of new 
laws.  Twenty years onwards, the tension of foreign interference in a domestic legal 
system has eased, making Rwanda a neutral territory to hold trials for the transferred 
cases.  Following the ICTR’s approach towards strengthening fair trial and penalty 
standards in Rwanda will be a valuable lesson for the future of International Criminal 
Law, particularly in light of increased domestic prosecutions. 
 
